University of Central Florida

STARS
Electronic Theses and Dissertations, 2004-2019
2010

(un)natural Bodies, Endangered Species, And Embodied Others In
Margaret Atwood's Oryx And Crake
Marcy Galbreath
University of Central Florida

Part of the American Literature Commons

Find similar works at: https://stars.library.ucf.edu/etd
University of Central Florida Libraries http://library.ucf.edu
This Masters Thesis (Open Access) is brought to you for free and open access by STARS. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Electronic Theses and Dissertations, 2004-2019 by an authorized administrator of STARS. For more
information, please contact STARS@ucf.edu.

STARS Citation
Galbreath, Marcy, "(un)natural Bodies, Endangered Species, And Embodied Others In Margaret Atwood's
Oryx And Crake" (2010). Electronic Theses and Dissertations, 2004-2019. 4349.
https://stars.library.ucf.edu/etd/4349

(UN)NATURAL BODIES, ENDANGERED SPECIES, AND EMBODIED
OTHERS IN MARGARET ATWOOD’S ORYX AND CRAKE

by

MARCY LYNN GALBREATH
A.A. Daytona Beach Community College, 1990
B.A. Flagler College, 1993

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of Master of Arts
in the Department of English
in the College of Arts and Humanities
at the University of Central Florida
Orlando, Florida

Summer Term
2010

© 2010 Marcy Galbreath

ii

ABSTRACT
The developing knowledge of life sciences is at the crux of Margaret Atwood’s Oryx and Crake
as she examines human promise gone awry in a near-future dystopia. This thesis examines
aspects of posthumanism, ecocriticism, and feminism in the novel’s scientific, cultural, and
environmental projections. Through the trope of extinction, Atwood’s text foregrounds the
effects of human exceptionalism and instrumentalism in relation to the natural world, and
engenders an analysis of human identity through its biological and cultural aspects. Extinction
thus serves as a metaphor for both human development and human excesses, redefining the idea
of human within the context of vulnerable species. Oryx and Crake reveals humanity’s organic
connections with non-human others through interspecies gene-splicing and the ensuing hybridity.
In this perspective, Atwood’s text provides a dialogue on humankind’s alienation from the natural
world and synchronic connections to the animal other, and poses timely questions for twentyfirst century consumerism, globalism, and humanist approaches to nature. The loss of balance
provoked by the apocalyptic situation in Oryx and Crake challenges commonplace attitudes
toward beneficial progress. This imbalance signals the need for a new narrative: A consilient
reimagining of humanity’s role on earth as an integrated organism rather than an intellectual
singularity.
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INTRODUCTION: THE EXTINCTION NARRATIVE
At the beginning of the twenty-first century, humankind expands its knowledge potential,
peering deep into the universe and far back in time to view events near the birth of the universe,
and deep into matter and biology to unlock the keys of life. The developing knowledge of life
sciences provides the foundation for Margaret Atwood’s novel Oryx and Crake as she examines
human promise gone awry in a near-future dystopia. Processes of embodiment and feedback
systems illuminate humanity’s organic connections with nonhuman others; this relatedness is the
key to the interspecies gene-splicing taking place in the novel. In this world, human being is
redefined in the context of other being, and the posthuman arises through genetic intervention,
inheriting an earth in which the original humans are virtually extinct.
The liberal humanist subject’s capacity for both mindful and blind rapaciousness is at the core of
Oryx and Crake, propelling a near-future scenario in which Homo sapiens is the endangered
species. But inside the narrative of proposed human extinction rests an acknowledgment of the
current mass extinction that may be attributable to human activity. In the interstices between
encroaching mass biosphere extinctions (resulting from global warming and unchecked
exploitation) and humanity’s extinction (rendered via a bio-engineered doomsday virus), Atwood
challenges our understanding of the relationship between what we self-name “human” and
nonhuman others. The same factors enabling cross-species gene transfer firmly embed humans
within the biology of all earth organisms, making us a creature as knowable by our likenesses as
by our differences to other life forms, and, similarly, as vulnerable to environmental factors.
According to N. Katherine Hayles, four criteria inform our understanding of the posthuman: the
primacy of information over materiality, the relegation of consciousness to second-tier
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significance, the view of body as “original prosthesis,” and the effortless joining of man and
machine. This perspective of the posthuman leads to “the union of the human with the intelligent
machine” as a “common theme” in posthuman philosophy and fiction (2-3). The idea of the
posthuman is intertwined with critiques of the “liberal humanist subject,” and overlaps postcolonial and post-modern theories in deconstructing a universal, unified humanist ideal (4).
While, as Hayles notes, many contemporary philosophers and fiction writers locate the
posthuman within the union of human and computer, the primary function of information
processing can also be examined through genetic intervention and re-embodiment. This version
of the posthuman is the direction Atwood follows in Oryx and Crake, proposing a re-figured
humanity, adapted for survival through multiple biological interfaces. Atwood’s presentation of
the posthuman through genetically-modified humans and other creatures challenges the bedrock
concept of “human” and opens a window for reevaluating non-human agency and sentience.
At the same time she reveals the biological correlations between humans and nonhumans,
Atwood highlights the psychological separation between humanity and the natural world,
apparent in the constructs of human habitat. Oryx and Crake portrays a world altered by global
warming and devastated by the “JUVE, Jetspeed Ultra Virus Extraordinary” (Atwood, Oryx and
Crake 341). The world prior to the virus is already in crisis: rapidly rising oceans have inundated
coastal cities and brought desertification to once lush landscapes (63). The resulting
environmental and social conditions drive the new elite, the lauded mathematical intellectuals,
into the “Compounds,” secure company-associated communities that are separated from the
“pleeblands” (27, 289) by twelve-foot high walls, barbed wire, and paramilitary security guards.
This segregation bisects society into the haves–those born with the “genius gene”–and the have-
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nots–the “neurotypicals” (194); it also further separates the urban populations of both locations
from the natural world. The characters of Jimmy, the narrator, and his best friend Crake
exemplify the new normal, where contact with wild nature is nonexistent, and even domestic pets
are limited, at least in the sphere of the Compounds, to genetically altered animals.
By developing these environments and the characters inhabiting them, Atwood poses extinction
as a metaphor for both aspiring self-knowledge and the countermanding self-destruction, and
redefines the idea of human in the context of vulnerable species—one among many. She draws
on current scientific research and theory to explicate potential future environmental scenarios,
and the technocracy’s disastrous consequences profiled in Oryx and Crake challenge
commonplace attitudes toward “beneficial” progress. In addition to vanished human and
nonhuman life, Oryx and Crake raises the specter of other forms of extinction, adding cultural
constructs, human relationships, biophilia, language, and ethical behavior to the endangered list.
The recurrent background theme of extinction links humanist approaches to the natural world
with potential outcomes, exploring roads we are currently traveling.
The protagonist, Jimmy/Snowman, and his best friend, Crake, are complementary figures, each
representing a different facet of the humanist model. 1 J. Brooks Bouson cites them “as paired
opposites,” noting that Oryx and Crake highlights “the division between the humanities and the
sciences” (140). The realm of humanity’s creative potential through artistic endeavor is
Jimmy/Snowman’s domain; this is opposed to Crake’s embodiment of empirical rationalist
thought. Both iterations of humanism owe their birth to the self-absorption and self-congratulation
1

“Jimmy” is the narrator’s name prior to the extinction event which destroys humanity; “Snowman” (as in
Abominable Snowman) is the appellation Jimmy assumes after the disaster (Atwood, Oryx and Crake 346-47).
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of western culture. While Oryx and Crake can be seen as deconstructive of the empirical model, it
can also be read as questioning the efficacy of Jimmy/Snowman’s brand of humanism. Atwood
herself admits to the text presenting a cautionary tale along the lines of Charles Dickens’ A
Christmas Carol (qtd. in Halliwell 260), but—intentionally or not—it also points to the culpability
of those who unquestioningly follow scientific and technological advances.
In his passive acquiescence, Jimmy/Snowman represents an indictment of western culture which,
sated on material possessions and hedonistic urges, accepts global warming, genetic mutations,
and extinction as inevitable progress. In addition to exemplifying the humanist tradition,
Jimmy/Snowman personifies the estrangement between modern western humanity and nature.
Even though he claims empathy, he is ill-suited for the post-apocalyptic world of resurgent
nature, which includes manufactured as well as naturally evolved organisms. Exploring the
ethics of contemporary genetic engineering through the altered creatures, Atwood gives
humanoid Crakers and nonhumans such as pigoons and rakunks prominence in the text. Food
animals, companion species, and genetically modified humans enter the narrative, furthering the
ethical examination of human technological advances, and posing timely questions for twentyfirst century consumerism, globalism, and commercialism.
While the complementary male characters of Jimmy/Snowman and Crake help define the
struggle between the related and contrasting humanist and empirical traditions in the novel, the
female characters of Jimmy’s mother, Sharon, and his lover, Oryx, illuminate the struggle
between humans and nature in terms of progress and colonization. Within these two figures, we
can discern several layers of categorization inherent in western thought. Sharon, born, educated,
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and normalized into a liberal western society, encounters troubling and obfuscating structures in
the empirical heritage of the Compounds. Oryx, in contrast, is an enigmatic figure grounded only
in a digital universe and Snowman’s imagination, and defined by her sexuality. Reminiscent of
her feminist observations in The Handmaid’s Tale, Atwood places the women of Oryx and
Crake in positions that raise issues of social, political, and ethical responsibilities for all genders.
Sharon illuminates a second-wave and ecofeminist perspective, questioning and then actively
challenging the corporate, patriarchal power structure of the Compounds and their malefic
attitude toward the natural world. Oryx represents a third-world female experience; hers is a
story of survival in the margins of a system that views indigenes as just another commodity for
consumption.
Since the publication of Oryx and Crake in 2003, various critics have provided insight and
analysis from multiple perspectives. Danette DiMarco notes that the figure of Crake “emerges as
the quintessential homo faber,” illustrating the instrumentalism Atwood critiques in the text
(171). DiMarco argues that Atwood raises the possibility of counteracting this instrumentalism
through positive social change as enacted by Jimmy/Snowman (172). Jayne Glover comments on
Crake’s instrumentalism through an ecocritical perspective, analyzing his “hyperseparation from
the Other, both from nature and from people in general” (55, 59). Bouson examines the biotech,
posthuman angles of the novel, exploring the satiric commentary Atwood aims at current
transgenic research, noting how the figures of Crake and Snowman become jokester and “human
joke” in Atwood’s bleak humor (140, 151). Looking to the mythic aspects of the novel, Grayson
Cooke observes the technical role of “language and writing” as a link to the “beginning and end
of ‘life’ and the ‘human’ as they are commonly understood” (106), and Chung-Hao Ku interprets
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the varying aspects of monstrosity in Atwood’s text, from the pathetic figure of Snowman, to the
inhuman Crakers, to human science through the figure of Crake: all speak of “the soft boundary
between human and monster” (109).
While I do not necessarily disagree with these critics, I argue that Oryx and Crake is also a
dialogue contrasting humanity’s simultaneous alienation from the natural world and homologous
connections to the animal other. Oryx and Crake merits a consilient evaluation, recognition that
humans are both biological and cultural beings. 2 This reading ties Atwood’s novel to fictive,
theoretical, and scientific texts through the mechanism of the extinction narrative. My analysis
explores Oryx and Crake through the lens of the various forms of extinction, using posthumanist,
ecocritical, and feminist theory to illuminate the threads that define both estrangement and affinity.
In the following pages I will call on posthumanist perspectives from N. Katherine Hayles, Donna
Haraway, Jean François Lyotard, Jacques Derrida, and Bill Readings, among others. These
theorists allow room in the definition of the posthuman to include an organic interface and
recognition of the animal other, a concept that takes flight in Atwood’s cast of human and
nonhuman characters. This viewpoint of posthumanism also segues into areas of ecocritical and
ecofeminist thought, and here the further works of Haraway, as well as texts by Caroline Merchant,
Patrick Murphy, Richard Louv, and E. O. Wilson provide supporting insights.
The interrelationships of the various theories as applied to Oryx and Crake help clarify Atwood’s
text; for instance, genetic modifications of plants, animals, and especially humans blur the
2

Glen Love explains the interdisciplinary use of science in evaluating literature as a core principle of ecocriticism,
citing scientific “methods of investigation as the best means we have for understanding our world, and for thinking
our way toward solutions to the problems of pollution, population, and despoliation” (561). E. O. Wilson argues
that “There has never been a better time for collaboration between scientists and philosophers, especially where they
meet in the borderlands between biology, the social sciences, and the humanities” (Consilience 11).
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defining lines between species and call for a reconfiguration of the meaning of “human.” This is
a primary conversation in posthumanism, but the ethics of genetic manipulation place Atwood’s
discussion in the realm of ecocritical thought as well. I argue that Oryx and Crake challenges the
information-only existence of the posthuman outside nature, as the extinction of humanism
Atwood describes parallels the self-contaminating death of informatics. In this rendering, the
posthuman cannot fully emerge while humanism still filters language, culture, and social
organizations, and during the dissolution of humanism the cyborgian tools for creating the
digitized posthuman are sacrificed as well. All that are left are the vestiges of original humans
and the organic inheritors of the human trace—the bestial pigoons and humanoid Crakers.
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CHAPTER ONE: ENDANGERED SPECIES
An Armageddon is approaching at the beginning of the third millennium. But it is
not the cosmic war and fiery collapse of mankind foretold in sacred scripture. It is
the wreckage of the planet by an exuberantly plentiful and ingenious humanity.
(xxiii)
E. O. Wilson,
The Future of Life
The balance of nature is not a status quo; it is fluid, ever shifting, in a constant
state of adjustment. Man, too, is part of this balance. Sometimes the balance is in
his favor; sometimes—and all too often through his own activities—it is shifted to
his disadvantage. (246)
Rachel Carson,
Silent Spring
Antecedents: A History of Earthly Destruction
In the rhythm of natural processes, the concept of extinction, when it penetrates, bears the
disquietude of unending loss. Extinction, after all, is final; after termination, it is beyond human
control. It is a rather recent idea in history, arriving a little over two hundred years ago, and it
still provokes resistance with many lay people when placed in human terms. 3 Dinosaurs are
easily understood as gone from the earth in a permanent way, disappearing long before humans
could interfere or question their existence. Dodos and the giant moa slide into our consciousness
as forever gone, and we understand human complicity in their disappearance. The “vast armies
of the passenger pigeons” are similarly understood as extinct through human agency, as John
Burroughs recounts in his journal:
The last great flight of them that I ever beheld was on the 10th of April, 1875,
when, for the greater part of the day, one could not at any movement look
skyward above the Hudson River Valley without seeing several flocks, great and
small, of the migrating birds . . . The pigeons never came back. (213)
3

According to research by D.A. Poling and E.M. Evans, the concept of human extinction as an inevitability is still
not readily accepted by lay-adults, even when they acknowledge the possibility of extinction. Poling and Evans
surmise the idea of inevitability “may be psychologically overwhelming” (380).
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Burroughs further notes that he, himself, may have participated by perhaps “killing the last
pigeon” (213). Though some mourn these human-caused extinctions, all too often the perception
is distanced by the lens of human exceptionalism: the nonhuman, in the context of extinction, is
an unfortunate but unavoidable loss due to the inevitability of human progress.
Evolutionary biologists tell us that of all the different kinds of life that have existed on earth, an
estimated 99% have gone extinct. 4 Some have disappeared through catastrophic events, such as
the asteroid which is believed to have contributed to the disappearance of the dinosaurs, but most
have simply succumbed to natural processes over time. The panoply of life we see today is just a
slice off the end of the temporal column, a thin flake bounded by human awareness. There is
little doubt that for most creatures, the natural destiny is extinction. Nonetheless, most
extinctions occur gradually, over time, and not in the rapid tumble initiated since the appearance
of humans. We may be the next catastrophic event. 5 But even with overwhelming evidence of
the fragility and ephemeral quality of species longevity, the idea of eventual human extinction is
inconceivable. Perhaps that is why it is such an effective literary tool, one that has been put forth
by numerous fiction writers. Eliminating humans introduces a defamiliarization, and a world
without people is an alien landscape: an unfilled promise. After all, according to most religions
and some philosophies, the earth was created specifically for people. By introducing the idea of
human absence, extinction narratives subvert humanism, religion, and science: man the thinker,
man the chosen one, man the maker is no more.

4

See Ayala (8572), Garrison (618), and Jablonski (589).
5 Michael Boulter states that human “use of fossil fuels and . . . disrespect for the environment are combining to
cause unprecedented falls in numbers of individuals of many species” (35), and Wilson asserts that “species of
plants and animals are disappearing a hundred or more times faster than before the coming of humanity” (xxiii).
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In “The Handmaid’s Tale and Oryx and Crake in Context,” Atwood defines her novels as
speculative rather than science fiction (513). Nonetheless, Oryx and Crake fits inside a long
tradition of science fiction narratives that entertain Earth’s destruction as a means to an end.
Oryx and Crake‘s antecedents include Nevil Shute’s On The Beach, Pat Frank’s Alas, Babylon,
Walter M. Miller Jr.’s A Canticle for Liebowitz, the film Planet of the Apes, Lester del Rey’s
“The Faithful,” John Wyndham’s The Day of the Triffids, Greg Bear’s Blood Music, and the
films Twelve Monkeys and Deep Impact. These narratives imagine different scenarios, such as a
post nuclear-holocaust world, various forms of biological plagues and bioengineered menaces,
and civilization-destroying natural disasters, but all imagine an earth bereft of a successful,
plentiful human species.
Some science fiction imagines simple survival after an extinction event (Alas Babylon, Deep
Impact), while others (“The Faithful,” Planet of the Apes, Blood Music) envision a radically
different reconstruction of reality. Atwood’s narrative combines both scenarios: simple survival
for Jimmy/Snowman and at least four other humans, and a new form of humanoid life in the
posthuman Crakers. While some of the natural disasters invoked in extinction narratives cannot
be attributed to mankind (such as asteroids), many of the other triggers are clearly due to
humans. In some cases it is humanism’s drive for ever-increasing knowledge, while in others it is
the western ideal of progress in the form of expansion and colonialism, or humankind’s long
tradition of warring territoriality. In Oryx and Crake, ambition cloaked in the guise of human
progress justifies war and weaponry, environmental desecration, and misguided medical
research. Some stories, such as del Rey’s “The Faithful,” revert to humanist outcomes or seem to
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justify humanist paradigms, but Oryx and Crake dissects humanism under a posthuman
microscope, exploring the limits of invention, awareness, and justice.
Atwood combines two extinction-level events in Oryx and Crake—global warming and a lethal
virus—to achieve the demise of Homo sapiens. While she admits to absorbing some science
fiction while growing up, such as H.G. Wells, Ray Bradbury, and John Wyndham (Atwood, “The
Handmaid’s Tale and” 514), she also credits more traditional literary sources as inspiration,
listing Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World, George Orwell’s 1984, and Evgenii Zemiatin’s We as
examples of a “kind of utopian thinking” with roots in the Bible’s Book of Revelations: “first
catastrophe, then blissful wonderfulness” (qtd. in Halliwell 257-58). Whether prompted by angst
over humanity’s sins of greed, avarice, and gluttony, Cold War fears of technology run amok, or
apprehension concerning environmental disaster, a humanity-scoured globe provides a clean
substrate for a new beginning.
This idyllic premise offers another chance at Eden’s garden, an opportunity to undo whatever evil
humanity has produced. Stephanie Turner views “The apocalyptic mode of expression” as
essentially “utopian,” an opportunity for “imagining of what happens after” (58), but Atwood’s
rendering of the future of life is an uneasy projection: it represents the dissolution of human culture
as we understand it. Her post-apocalypse pictures not the death of a group of individuals, but of
humanity as a species. Even if a few humans survive, because of depleted surface metals they
could not rise above a stone age level; thus, “it’s game over forever” for civilization as we
understand it (Atwood, Oryx and Crake 223). In this regard, the novel acts as a warning for the
present. Jayne Glover posits that science fiction literature, in its “use of thought experiments,” is an
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effective means of entering the eco-critical discourse and provoking awareness of “the potential
consequences of our current ecological crisis” (51). Furthermore, as Coral Ann Howells notes in
her discussion of Oryx and Crake, “the primary function of a dystopia” may be “to send out danger
signals to its readers” (161). Atwood herself said in an interview with Martin Halliwell, “if nothing
changes and we keep doing what we’re doing, we are heading for the perfect storm,” a confluence
of factors which will take the ensuing events far beyond our control (260).

Humanity’s Turn
Dystopias are natural frames of estrangement, scenarios that detach us from our sense of the
normal. But Oryx and Crake’s dystopic future also indicts contemporary alienation, the rift
human culture has instituted between itself and the natural world. Poet Gary Snyder describes
this separation as a “priapic drive for material accumulation” enacted by “men . . . working out
their ultimate destinies (paradise? perdition?) with planet earth as the stage for the drama—trees
and animals as mere props, nature a vast supply depot” (103). Dysfunctional examples of the
division abound in Oryx and Crake: from the nature-less pleeblands to the synthetic creations of
the Compounds, untampered nature is held apart as Other and as raw material. Only after the
JUVE epidemic is Jimmy/Snowman confronted with unadulterated nature.
Snowman is the lone human survivor of the virus (as far as he knows); he is the “Lonesome
George” of the human species, the lonely remainder of his kind. 6 His memories are the only
tools the reader has of reconstructing the species, and with those Snowman fills in the gaps of the
pre-JUVE world. Through Snowman’s recollections we see the walled enclave Compounds and
6

Lonesome George, the Galápagos tortoise, is “the lone survivor of the abingdoni subspecies from Pinta Island”
(Caccone et al. 13223).
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overcrowded urban pleeblands, both artificial environments that isolate humans from the natural
world. We also see the political and social changes that humanity experiences as it faces global
warming: frequent and severe droughts and resultant food scarcities, increasingly virulent
diseases, self-serving oligarchies, segmentation and segregation of humans by intellect, and
bioengineered animals for increased food production and medical organ harvesting. DiMarco
describes the bipartite social segregation as a “systemic acceptance of separation and enclosure
from communities and people not engaged in similar work”; this segregation amplifies
economic, intellectual, and political divisions of power (177). The division of western society
into a “false dichotomy” of beneficial Compound life and dysfunctional pleebland existence,
according to Glover, “highlights the darker side of utopia and the ambiguous nature of dystopia”
(54). By emphasizing the Compounds’ authoritarian regime and the pleeblands’ borderless
nature, each human location is shown to be more, and less, than it seems.
The extensive information Snowman provides on pre-plague humanity contrasts with the limited
tableau he presents of the nonhuman world. We can deduce the reason for his lack of knowledge
or connection with nature once we examine the environment that formed his understanding, the
Compounds. The walled city-states of the corporate Compounds have replaced the national
government, doing away with the illusion of a free elective democracy. Those who control the
biosciences and generate the profits are the royalty of this new society, and their isolation in the
Compounds is justified because the world outside has “Too much hardware, too much software,
too many hostile bioforms, too many weapons of every kind, and too much fanaticism and bad
faith” (Atwood, Oryx and Crake 28). Security from infectious vectors spread by competing
corporations is the rationale behind the enclosures; this security promises a sterile environment
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that precludes the natural world as well as suspect humans (19, 32, 53, 197). The cynical
spectacle of a government and legal system with a primary focus of profits is manifested in the
types of crime the official enforcement arm—the CorpsSeCorps—is vested in controlling:
saboteurs, environmental and social justice activists, and protesters. Ethics are subject to
productivity in the world of the Compounds, and genetic manipulation or any other research is
only judged through the lens of market worth. Those who question or reject this paradigm are
considered traitors “to the general good,” and dealt with by execution, as in the case of Crake’s
father and Jimmy’s mother (212, 258).
Inside the Compounds, both nature and culture are re-sculpted into simulacra, faux constructions
like the “fake Georgian and fake Tudor and fake French provincial” houses, with complementary
replica furniture (Atwood, Oryx and Crake 227). Since real food is scarce, soy-based substitutes
dressed to appear as many different dishes are considered normal fare. Indicating his awareness
of the fabrication, Crake intones, “You never know . . . What is reality?” (83). The Compounds
themselves have names that trouble reality, such as “OrganInc Farms,” “NooSkins,”
“HelthWyzer,” and “RejoovenEsense,” names that hint at their purpose under a persuasive gloss
(22, 53, 225). But the question of authenticity looms largest with genetically modified biological
organisms, since the only nature Jimmy and Crake experience first-hand is the manipulated
nature inside the Compounds.
It may be possible to understand the building blocks of life, as do the Compound’s scientists,
without achieving the affinity with nature that is part of our evolutionary history. Some theorists
insist that exposure to wild, untamed nature is necessary for our very health, producing an
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“innate tendency to focus upon life and lifelike forms, and in some instances to affiliate with
them emotionally,” a reaction known as “biophilia” (Wilson, The Future 134). In Oryx and
Crake, biophilia is rare, and children understand by a very young age that nature is something to
be tricked and consumed. “When he was old enough” Jimmy learns about his father’s job bioengineering pigs into organ banks in the process by which pigs became pigoons. The financial
implications of the project—“A great deal of investment money had gone into OrganInc
Farms”—are stressed (Atwood, Oryx and Crake 22-23). Thus, biology and profit are united, and
nature is quantified as a utilitarian commodity.
Children who are nature deprived, Richard Louv asserts, suffer from a condition he describes as
“nature deficit disorder” (34). “Nature,” he indicates, “offers something that the street or gated
community or computer game cannot”; it “exposes the young directly and immediately to the
very elements from which humans evolved” (97). Jimmy’s enclosed, computer-entertained
experience is normal in the pre-JUVE world; he epitomizes a western way of life unengaged
with nature. His distancing is part of the enculturation process he experiences as a child, a
process not only severing him from directly experiencing uncontrolled nature, but also numbing
him to any real connection with the humans in his life. Patrick Murphy recognizes this kind of
disassociation as “a belief in the radical independence of human beings from all else, including
each other,” and a view that facilitates denial in “all ongoing human interrelationship with the
rest of nature” as well as the human place in evolutionary processes (144).
The artificiality of Jimmy’s experience is clear in his earliest memory of “a huge bonfire” of
burning cows, sheep, and pigs, animals that have been infected with a man-made virus (Atwood,
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Oryx and Crake 15). He feels empathy for the animals “because they were being burned and
surely that would hurt them” (18). He is later introduced to some live pigoons, which are
“slightly frightening . . . They glanced up at him as if they saw him, really saw him, and might
have plans for him later” (26). But regardless of the impression of agency the pigoons leave,
these interactions are veiled with the commodified, objectified status of the nonhuman. Jimmy’s
childhood contains no recollections of Boy Scout camping trips, journeys to national parks, or
even unguided play in the woods. The “golf course and lily ponds had been their hunting
grounds” on Jimmy’s grade-school field trips (148), limiting the children’s exposure to a
controlled version of nature. The idea of controlling nature is at heart a humanist ideal: “The
image of nature that became important in the early modern period,” according to Carolyn
Merchant, “was that of a disorderly and chaotic realm to be subdued and controlled” (127). In the
Compounds, nature is simply the raw material from which humans fashion a consumer culture.
The direction of western culture understood as progress has been a trajectory away from natural
connections, and human economies are built on using, not knowing nature. Jimmy receives most
of his knowledge of wild animals from “old DVDs” he watched as a child, “those animalbehaviour programs featuring copulation and growling and innards, and mothers licking their
young”; he cannot comprehend why “he found them so reassuring” (Atwood, Oryx and Crake
10). He recalls that he never cared for the birds he saw on the field trips, and “he never swam in
the sea as a child”; his constrained exposure endows him with neither mastery nor a biophilic
relationship with unhampered nature. For Jimmy, nature is punishing, dangerous, and
frightening—“who knows what may infest the lagoon?” (6). By the time Jimmy is a teenager,
biophiliacs are pushed to the edges of society, and either manifest in overt protest, as in the
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group known as “God’s Gardeners” (257), or in covert internet entities such as “MaddAddam”
(216-17). Nature deficit disorder, reproduced on a society-wide scale, has emerged as a culture in
which all nature is commodified, valued only as seed stock in corporate ventures. Extinction thus
can be seen as a form of alienation as well as the traditional idea of non-being. Organisms go
extinct (when not simply hunted into extinction) through environmental degradation or loss of
habitat. The artificial environments humans create are no protection from extinction; in fact, they
are a primary factor in the demise of a humanity estranged not just from the external world, but
from itself as well.

Home, Alone
Sharon, Jimmy’s mother, recognizes the artificiality and the “theme park” atmosphere of this
privileged lifestyle, where a safe existence precludes notions of privacy and liberty and includes
strip searches by hostile guards (27, 53). A significant figure in Snowman’s memories, she
stands as another source of loss. Sharon emerges as an endangered species through both her
inability to function as a maternal figure, and as the voice of ethics against the Compound
mentality. Disconnected from her child, she is too preoccupied and angry with what she knows
of the Compounds’ actions to notice Jimmy’s need, and although her “mother-figure functions as
the ethical conscience of the text” (Fiona 279), Sharon does not project unconditional motherly
consistence into her role. A microbiologist formerly employed by the Compound, she leaves her
job to “stay home with” Jimmy about the time he starts first grade (Atwood, Oryx and Crake 30).
At times, Jimmy remembers, “She was like a real mother,” but “those moods of hers didn’t last
long” (30). More often, her response is “the flat voice, the blank eyes, the tired staring out of the
window” (32). This most un-maternal of actors chooses to give up the agency, power, and
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prestige of her Compound job to stay home with a school-bound child, a move that renders her
suspect in both her child’s and the Compound’s eyes.
Jimmy’s most prevalent recollections of his parents involve bitter fights; knowing what comes
after, it seems Jimmy’s role in life is to witness not just tragedy, but the keys to tragedy as well.
Sharon intimates the questionable nature of the biological research going on in the Compounds
when she accuses Jimmy’s father of engaging in “immoral . . . sacrilegious” actions (57). That
Crake will later take similar knowledge to construct a doomsday virus is adequate proof to the
verity of her claim, but at the time Jimmy’s father challenges her intelligence and judgment,
asserting human intellectual primacy over any spiritual concerns: “It’s just proteins . . . there’s
nothing sacred about cells and tissue.” Sharon remembers wanting to make “life better for
people—not just people with money,” a vision not in keeping with the Compound philosophy
(57). DiMarco explains that Sharon’s “stance . . . marginalizes her and ultimately marks her as a
subversive” (189), a deadly categorization in the context of the corporate state.
As Jimmy recalls, several years later his mother abandons the family, but a clear understanding
of why she leaves is not apparent until much later, when Crake reveals how his father died. The
pharmaceutical companies that own the Compounds are in the business of dealing death as well
as life: they manufacture illnesses to assure steady market demand. As Crake relates to Jimmy,
“They put the hostile bioforms into their vitamin pills—their HelthWyzer over-the-counter
premium brand” with a “really elegant delivery system” (Atwood, Oryx and Crake 211).
“Elegant” signifies clever scientific manipulation in the “patronizing jargon the math nerds used”
(142); in this connection, the Compound geniuses are fooling the rest of the population into
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illness and disease. 7 Crake’s father, who discovers what is happening, is pushed off an overpass
because he is about to blow the whistle, and it is likely that Jimmy’s mother runs away because
she knows similar information and understands the related danger (213).
Sharon’s disappearance establishes the void of extinction, but for Jimmy the process is a drawnout progression of estrangement. He loses his mother over many years, and even after she leaves
the loss continues, as the CorpsSeCorps questions him regularly attempting to find her. He sees
her only twice again, both times on film, once during “the blockade of the Happicuppa headoffice compound in Maryland” (Atwood, Oryx and Crake 181), and once in front of a firing
squad. The use of film to resurrect Jimmy’s dead mother mirrors the nature videos he
experienced as a boy: both provide false evidence of something no longer existing in reality.
They are shadow images produced through human manipulation, vulgar effigies which attempt
but fail to mask the finality of extinction. In the execution video, Sharon says “Remember
Killer” before she is gunned down (258), a reminder that she had taken Jimmy’s pet rakunk with
her when she left the family, for the purpose of “liberating her” (61). This revives another loss,
that of an entity “quite important to him” (Atwood, qtd. in Halliwell 254). As a child, Jimmy is
not allowed a puppy or kitten as a pet because of the tight security against diseases which might
affect the bioengineered animals; instead, his father brings home a rakunk, a gene-spliced mix of
raccoon and skunk (Atwood, Oryx and Crake 32, 51). Jimmy names her “Killer,” and she is the
one constant in his life: “She always forgave him” (60). After Sharon has run away, Jimmy is not
sure whether he is mourning “His mother, or an altered skunk” more—an indication of the weak
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As the term is used in the scientific community, “elegance” is “the parsimonious and evocative description of
pattern to make sense out of a confusion of detail” (Wilson, Consilience 219).
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connection between him and his mother, and the extinction of affection which had already
eroded their relationship (61).

The Death of Words
When Jimmy graduates high school and goes to college, he enters another nature antagonistic
environment, the pleeblands. These urban centers are not walled, but “so boundless, so porous,
so penetrable, so wide open. So subject to chance” (Atwood, Oryx and Crake 196). Since the
elite social class has flown to the Compounds, those who are left in the pleeblands are the
neurotypicals, unvalued since they are not mathematical geniuses (194). Jimmy leaves one very
prestigious cage for another form of containment, a few steps down on the social register.
Neither site offers the connections with nature that would overcome nature deficit disorder.
Jimmy’s college is the Martha Graham Institute, a former “Arts-and-Humanities” college that
now advertises “Our Students Graduate with Employable Skills” (186-88). Cultural pursuits are
the endangered species at Martha Graham, as right-brain students struggle to establish value in a
left-brain world. Art, “all that’s left over” of a culture when everything else is gone (167), has
been devalued as not commercially viable. The disappearance of the cultural arts is attributed in
part to the digital revolution, as production capabilities have been brought within reach of the
layman. “Anyone with a computer could splice together whatever they wanted,” Jimmy explains,
“or digitally alter old material, or create new animations.” The mystique of creativity is “no
longer central to anything” (187). Music, dance, visual arts, and literature are reduced to
peripheral talents, fading as rapidly as the disappearing biota.
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Jimmy, weak in math and science, is thus considered a “dull-normal”; a word person, he
represents the remains of the humanist subject (Atwood, Oryx and Crake 50, 25). In his preJUVE life, Jimmy has an affectation for archaisms—words no longer used, nor of any value to
anyone. This loss of language is another form of extinction, of utterances passing through a
culture, then discarded unwanted. For Jimmy, these old words contain “a precision and
suggestiveness that no longer had a meaningful application in today’s world.” He acquires
“strangely tender feeling[s]” regarding words he pulls from ancient books in the Martha Graham
library, such as “wheelwright, lodestone, saturnine” and “adamant”; it is “as if they were
children abandoned in the woods and it was his duty to rescue them” (195). But Jimmy’s
attraction to words begins much earlier than Martha Graham, and he is borrowing words like
“vile” from his parent’s fights while still a child (60). As an adolescent watching online sites, he
is entranced by “At Home With Anna K.” because of her recitations of Shakespeare: “Think
what he might not have known if it hadn’t been for her. Think of the words. Sere, for instance.
Incardine” (85).
One of Jimmy’s girlfriends, Amanda Payne, extends the metaphor of dying words with her
artwork, a form she calls “Vulturizing” (245). It involves “a truckload of large dead animal
parts” arranged in the shape of four letter words in a vacant field, which she photographs from a
helicopter once they are covered in vultures (244). She selects the words “with care,” and “So far
she’d done PAIN . . . WHOM, and then GUTS.” Whereas Jimmy is concerned with salvaging
complex, historical words, Amanda is content with murdering simple words; her work brings
“them to life . . . and then it kill[s] them” (245).
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The Crakers also play a part in the loss of language, as the old words have no context for them.
Even with Snowman as teacher and the Crakers as avid students, some ideas cannot be
transversed. When he tries to explain the meaning of a simple word to them, such as “toast,” it
only raises more questions: the Crakers have no concept of manufactured food, agriculture, or
technology (48). Human civilization does not exist in their frame of reference, so there is no
commonality upon which to base understanding. They “would hear him,” as Howells observes,
“but with brains from which passion and imagination have been erased, they would not
understand him” (172). Jimmy recognizes that even if he writes a diary, “he’ll have no future
reader,” not only because of the Crakers’ inability to read, but also because of their lack of
connection to his reality: “Any reader he can possibly imagine is in the past” (41).
The antiquated utterances he keeps repeating to himself frame the dissolution of humanistic
integrity and disappearing ideals, and as such play a role in the extinction of culture. The words
are communication artifacts, leftovers from a dead civilization and remnants of the human
species. Even Snowman finds himself losing the meaning of some words, such as “Mesozoic,” a
word which “He can see” and “hear,” but which “he can’t reach . . . He can’t attach anything to
it” (39). Without a reader and without a listener, the language of humanity is reduced to bare
essentials. As Cooke points out, “Atwood suffuses her book with the sense of a lament for
language, for words, and for the creative endeavours conducted with words” (120). In his solitary
last-man state, Jimmy tries to hold onto the words, but they keep evaporating, disappearing like
the lost culture they denote.
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Extinction, the Game
Atwood presents the human role in extinction through two proxies: “Blood and Roses” and
“EXTINCTATHON” (Atwood, Oryx and Crake 78, 80). The games are part of a suite of internet
venues Atwood uses to illustrate the alienating and dehumanizing potential of online
entertainment. Through this online universe, Jimmy’s ideas of reality take form. With no
supervision and Crake’s hacking ability, the boys have a virtual tour through an online
environment filled with child porn, live executions, assisted suicide, and animal snuff sites. They
gain the understanding that life is cheap, seemingly worth only its entertainment value to a jaded
western audience. The sites have names like “Felicia’s Frog Squash,” “hedsoff.com,”
“brainfrizz.com,” and “nitee-nite.com” (82-83). The games include “computer chess or ThreeDimensionals,” “Kwiktime Osama,” and “Barbarian Stomp” (77). But the boys’ favorite games
are the online multi-player games Blood and Roses and Extinctathon (78, 80).
Blood and Roses and Extinctathon, in which Jimmy and Crake become immersed, rely on a
player’s knowledge of human and natural history, respectively. The parallelism of Blood and
Roses and Extinctathon can be seen mirroring the partition of the humanities and science;
similarly, the boys’ relationship infers the dichotomy of the two branches of knowledge. 8 Neither
Jimmy nor Crake understand the other’s predilection; Jimmy’s job of “wordserf” is one he is
sure “Crake would despise,” while Crake’s research “might not be something Jimmy could
understand any more” (253). Crake’s disdain for the kind of knowledge in which Jimmy
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Wilson recognizes the contemporary forms of “the great branches of learning . . . natural sciences, social sciences,
and the humanities” as arising from “the unified Enlightenment vision generated during the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries.” He views increasing separation and specialization since that time as an impediment to
consilience, “the unification of knowledge” (Consilience 37, 40).
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excels—crafting words to shape meaning—is matched by Jimmy’s hopelessness in the face of
ever matching up to the “math-and-chem-and-applied-bio yardstick” important in the
Compounds (50).
Blood and Roses matches contestants in a recitation of cultural accomplishments versus human
destruction, and winners gain points by accumulating “human achievements”: “The Divine
Comedy. Greek statuary. Aqueducts. Paradise Lost.” All the gains are overcome, though, by
“The Vikings. The Crusades. Ghengis Khan” or “Attila the Hun” (79). No points are earned
unless a suitable number of people die and the player can remember the quantity of corpses
because the game demands “atrocities on a large scale” (78-79). Jimmy observes the “Blood
player usually won” because “it was easier to remember the Blood stuff,” but he keeps to himself
the fact he suffers “severe nightmares” after playing (80). Jimmy is adept at Blood and Roses,
scoring some wins against Crake, but he is also sensitive to the implications that whole human
cultures are vulnerable to the same threats his beloved archaic words face: they are temporary
phenomena, brief flares against repetitive darkness.
“EXTINCTATHON, Monitored by MaddAddam,” rewards players for knowledge of plant or
animal extinctions “within the past fifty years,” and those who achieve a score of three thousand
earn the title Grandmaster (80, 214). While Blood and Roses illuminates the futility of human
creativity under the overwhelming human propensity for self-destruction, Extinctathon makes
visible the sheer quantity of human-advanced extinctions: the computer printout is “a couple
hundred pages of fine print and filled with obscure bugs, weeds, and frogs nobody had ever
heard of,” and memorable to no one except the Grandmasters, who have “brains like search
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engines” (81). Atwood’s projection mirrors the claims of contemporary biologists, who estimate
declines in biotic diversity by a scale of fifty percent by century’s end if current trends continue. 9
Under the auspices of extinction, Atwood establishes a dialogue on the Adamic prerogative of
naming: the gateway to the Extinctathon website proclaims “Adam named the living animals,
MaddAddam names the dead ones” (80). Scientific knowledge rests on understanding nature
through identification and categorization, management processes initiated and codified through
classical and Enlightenment thinkers. The basic Aristotelian principles of classification are
developed by Carolus Linneaus in the eighteenth century into the nomenclature system that
appears in the “Latin names” of Extinctathon’s “Phylum Class Order Family Genus Species”
(80-81). By sequestering the naming principle, MaddAddam is usurping institutional power from
the Compound scientists, a power that extends to “customizing” the animals in secret, subversive
activities. MaddAddam’s modifications rebut Compound gene-splicing for profit, alternatively
producing creatures such as “microbe[s] that [eat] the tar in asphalt” which are used in disruptive
acts of protest (216).
Extinctathon players must adopt a designation from the ranks of extinct animals, names from
creatures that, like Jimmy’s archaic words, are no longer valued nor mourned in the world of the
Compounds. Animal names confer both anonymity and power as players create their new online
personas. It is from Extinctathon that Crake gains the appellation he will retain for the rest of his
life, after the “Red-necked Crake,” an extinct Australian bird (81). His original name, Glenn, is
no competition for the identity of Crake, and Snowman “has trouble thinking of Crake as Glenn,
9

“It is safe to say,” according to Wilson, “that at least a fifth of the species of plants and animals [will] be gone or
committed to early extinction by 2030, and half by the end of the century” (The Future of Life 102).
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so thoroughly . . . has the later persona blotted out his earlier one” (70). Not so for the name
Crake selects for Jimmy, “Thickney,” taken from “a defunct Australian double-jointed bird that
used to hang around in cemeteries” (81). While, as J. Brooks Bouson notes, Thickney becomes
appropriate after the world turns into the post-JUVE “graveyard” (144), Jimmy prefers to
select his own name:
‘My name is Snowman,’ said Jimmy, who had thought this over. He no longer
wanted to be Jimmy, or even Jim, and especially not Thickney: his incarnation as
Thickney hadn’t worked out well. He needed to forget the past—the distant past,
the immediate past, the past in any form. He needed to exist only in the present,
without guilt, without expectation . . . Perhaps a different name would do that for
him. (Atwood, Oryx and Crake 348-49)
As the Abominable Snowman, Jimmy appropriates the label of a mythological creature, breaking
the naming rules Crake establishes of demonstrable “physical equivalent[s]” (7). The
Abominable Snowman—Jimmy’s minor act of rebellion against the memory of Crake—contains
a measure of safety: it can never become extinct, because it never was real to begin with.
Crake is very skilled at playing Extinctathon, accumulating enough points for Grandmaster
status. Like the early naturalists who sought to preserve knowledge of species by collecting their
dead furred, scaled, and feathered bodies, Crake collects the names of extinct species at the same
time he plots to save nature by eliminating humanity. Jimmy finds much later that Crake never
ceased involvement with the game, and in fact garnered his own cadre of MaddAddam
bioengineers to help develop both the Crakers and the JUVE virus; the creation of both could
simply be seen as Crake’s winning move in the final round of Extinctathon. Through the games
and Jimmy and Crake’s involvement, Atwood joins cultural extinction to biotic extinction, and,
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through Crake’s Grandmaster status, to human species extinction; all fall along a continuum of
human involvement.
Jimmy’s exposure to the world is informed by his online education, and despite the quantities of
data available to him, his remains a parochial, nature-free existence. Not really comprehending
(unlike Crake) the scale of destruction happening outside human terms, Jimmy’s experience with
extinction is bound to the personal. He does not reflect on the demise of organisms not intimately
related to his circle of existence: they are abstractions, tokens in a game. For Jimmy/Snowman,
extinction is revealed in a pile of burning cows; it is manifested through the slow, tortuous fading
of the maternal presence; it is bright, sharp loss when Killer disappears; it is dematerializing human
culture and language; and it is the deaths of Crake and Oryx—the two humans he mourns out of all
the multitude, and the two who, as mythic elements, come to symbolize a vanished species.
Thus, the extinction narrative revealed through Jimmy/Snowman’s experience brings us to the
precipice of humanism’s dissolution. In the next chapter I will look closer at the disappearance of
the humanist subject and the arrival of his replacement, the posthuman “Children of Crake” (9).
Inheritors of a much different world, the Crakers embody a derivative humanity, an alien
subjectivity possible only in a world cleansed of humanism.
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CHAPTER TWO: THE POSTHUMAN MICROSCOPE
The Extinction of Humanism
By definition, humanism places humans at the center of meaning. As a cautionary tale, Oryx and
Crake deconstructs this meaning by demonstrating the consequences of a monocular concept of
existence; this tunnel vision willfully ignores the natural interconnections of all life. Snowman’s
memories preserve humanity’s path to extinction, but they also record the devolution of
technology’s promise. Technology, humanism’s darling, provides material proof that reason
separates us from the beasts. In manifesting scientific knowledge, technology serves the noble
purpose of improving living conditions by preventing hunger, enhancing medical care, and
connecting communities, but technology also has a dark side, enabling human consumption to
pursue an ever-increasing destructive arc.
While Jimmy provides the historical and cultural facet to the humanist subject, Crake provides
the other side: secular, self-sufficient, empirical, and logical. Crake scoffs at humanist cultural
vestiges, not understanding the humanist influences on the scientific methodology practiced in
the university labs and on the individuated lives he and his “con-specifics” lead (Atwood, Oryx
and Crake 209). Even in his desire to create a genetically improved human, Crake bows to the
idea that humanity must continue. We have already encountered Jimmy’s faltering paradigm in
the shrinking influence of cultural endeavors and aesthetic language, recessions that reflect the
vaunted importance of science and reason. But Crake’s world is devolving as well, as science
and technology serve only capitalistic interests with a blind eye to the organic system failure
happening on a planet-wide scale.
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Whereas Jimmy exhibits only peripheral attention to the decaying humanist artifice prior to the
apocalypse, Crake shares active awareness with MaddAddam, the Extinctathon group, that
continually-improving biotechnology cannot salvage a mutilated biosphere. As he tells Jimmy,
humans are running out of time: “Demand for resources has exceeded supply for decades in
marginal geopolitical areas, hence the famines and droughts; but very soon, demand is going to
exceed supply for everyone” (295). Inequities abound, with the privileged few—the “graft-ridden
prince[s]” living as royalty in the Compounds —consuming more than their fair share of energy
and goods with small regard for the deteriorating environment (245), while the poor masses of
third-world countries place burdens on shrinking resources through ever-growing populations.
Impoverished farmers in countries impacted by global warming sell their children in order to
survive (116), and even in America those outside the Compounds struggle for survival, with
“squatters” living in “sheds and huts put together from scavenged materials—sheets of tin, slabs
of plywood” (183).
New biotechnologies are driven by commercial applications, with minimal concern over
deleterious side effects to either human or animal populations. Atwood’s text is littered with
cases of unintended consequences and the chain-reaction of errors compounding errors. One
example, the “gen-mod coffee wars,” presents a foreseeable outcome for an improved coffee
bean that replaces human labor with mechanized farming. What is beneficial for the developed
world—“a cheaper cup of coffee”—dislocates laborers and small growers alike, and triggers
insurrection (178-80). Another illustration is the gene-spliced bobkitten, which when multiplied
becomes a much larger, more dangerous problem than the “big green rabbits” it is supposed to
control (163-64). Solutions like the “Happicuppa bean, developed by a HelthWyzer subsidiary”
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(178), and the disease-carrying HelthWyzer vitamin pills (211) are symptoms of science
captivated by the bottom line and perverted by profit.
Extinction for the analytical aspect of humanism is not as blatant as the cultural extirpation, but it
is happening nonetheless. Despite technological advances and increased understanding of the
chemical building blocks of life, science has not produced an integrated, harmonious means of
planetary survival, and the ideal of the human subject able to muscle through any situation with
mental agility and willpower has delivered humanity to a cul-de-sac: global warming is the
reality swamping New York City (former site of much cultural enterprise and one-time financial
center of the world) while searing the food producing regions of the world. The empirical vision
still works toward controlling nature and concentrating material well-being for a few elites, but
the illusory nature of that control is surfacing. The struggle of maintaining the chimera of an
open cornucopia of good health, bountiful food, and creature comfort is increasingly difficult,
and reveals itself in artifice and prosthesis: “soy-sausage dogs and coconut-style layer cake”
(72), “SoyOBoyburgers” (74), “ChickieNobs Bucket O’Nubbins” (242), and the pharmaceutical
organ-bank pigoons.
Human progress thus follows a logical, cynical trend channeling all scientific and technological
developments into capitalist profit centers. The knowledge and craft that separate us from other
animals does not make us more humane, and the numeric success of the human species does not
necessarily reveal wisdom. Instead, what scientific knowledge and technology signify in this
context is the blindness of an anthropocentric, empirical worldview that offers no hope of
awakening. Neither artistic idealism nor scientific regimen can undo the climatic damage caused
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by several centuries of industrial production, and the deadly fate of humanity in Oryx and Crake
illustrates that human survival ultimately depends on adaptation to, rather than colonization of,
the biosphere.

Mechanical Constructs and Composite Organisms
The posthuman emerges from the rifts that also give birth to post-structuralism, post-modernism,
post-colonialism, and gender studies: the works of Charles Darwin, Karl Marx, and Sigmund
Freud. 10 These worldviews all challenge the centrality of the human subject, calling into question
divine preference, social assumptions, and unadulterated cognizance. In particular, these shifts in
understanding highlight the positioning of the white male subject of European stock, the
foundation of the humanist subject. Once these presumptions have been aired the possibility of
reconstruction is opened, bringing with it the posthuman. But the posthuman also carries traces
of humanism in its DNA: the language theorizing and describing this new construction is built
with the architecture of humanist thought. The armature guiding construction of the posthuman is
itself recursive of humanist processes and values. 11 While Hayles questions “will the
transformation into the posthuman annihilate the subject?” (281), she also recognizes that “many
attributes of the liberal humanist subject, especially the attribute of agency, continue to be valued
in the face of the posthuman” (279).
Even as the informatics view of posthumanism visualizes disembodiment—downloading the
mind into a computer—as the ultimate evolution, we must remember it is still contextualized as a
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In discussing the relationship between posthumanism and deconstruction, Neil Badmington argues “humanism
never manages to constitute itself; it forever rewrites itself as posthumanism” (9).
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human mind. As Eugene Thacker recognizes, this form of posthumanism “consciously models
itself as a type of humanism,” retaining “certain unique qualities of the human—self-awareness,
consciousness and reflection, self-direction and development, the capacity for scientific and
technological progress, and the valuation of rational thought” (75). The difficulty of escaping the
humanist trajectory precludes finality in constructing the posthuman: posthumanism must always
question its own genesis, purpose, and reality.
The Cartesian concept of the mind/body split aligns with the posthuman viewpoint of “the
body as the original prosthesis,” simply a tool to be controlled by the mind (Hayles 3). From
this vantage point, information is prioritized, and the human brain is perceived to operate like a
computer, “independent of any material realization or embedding in a social context or
anything having to do with emotion or development” (de Waal and Thompson 46).
Nonetheless, the human brain is not isolated from the body, and in fact relies extensively on
physical sensory receivers (skin, eyes, ears, and nose) to provide informational feedback in
dealing with the external environment. The mind—that which we recognize as resulting from
the processes of the brain—is, according to E.O. Wilson, “the coded representation of sensory
impressions and the memory and imagination of sensory impressions” (Consilience 109).
Furthermore, research reveals that chemical triggers enable this coded perception, and that
hormones and enzymes play critical roles in how our bodies and brains process sensory input.
The brain is dependant on the body for acquiring nutrients which make possible synaptic
processes; elements such as calcium, potassium, copper, and iodine enable the chemical
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transactions producing thought (Gómez-Pinilla 569-71). In this respect, humans are tethered to
the physical, organic sphere and an animal ancestry. 12
People are not born human, but become human as part of learning, enculturation, and mimicry,
and exist as humans relative to other humans in social units. As Evan Thompson relates,
“cognitive science has had to rediscover things like empathy and enculturation . . . it’s not going
to be possible to understand human mental life without connecting it to sociality and emotion
and embodiment” (de Waal and Thompson 46). Our emotional, language, and cognitive faculties
have to recapitulate evolution in each new generation. 13 Technophiles imparting primacy to the
information-processing part of human intelligence argue that sensory inputs can be replaced with
mechanical constructs, but this scenario assumes an ability to replicate natural structures while
maintaining fidelity to existing biological capabilities. The result may be a pixilated, digitally
enhanced reality; we have no way of knowing whether the sensory input from these kinds of
engineered solutions will engender the same organic learning responses humans currently enjoy.
“For information to exist,” Hayles affirms, “it must always be instantiated in a medium” (13),
and in humans these modes of information and data transfer reside within a physical body. She
goes on to confirm that “Embodiment can be destroyed, but it cannot be replicated,” denying the
informatics ideal of disembodied human intelligence. If you remove the physical instantiation—
the human body—then the mind has nothing to retrieve, process, and share. We exist, mind and
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metabolism and synaptic plasticity and, thus, mediate the effects of food on cognitive functions” in his argument
linking diet to human evolution (569).
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body, in the corporeal realm, and the finality of extinction, whether it involves “the planet” or
“an individual life-form,” is beyond the reach of human control (49).
To Jimmy, the pre-JUVE world elicits a mind-body split, but it is the body, not the brain, that has
control. For Jimmy (and many others, from his memories of online representations of
grotesqueries, bodily vanities, and pleasure of the flesh) the body, that which humanism
considered a “corrupt vessel or else a puppet” (Atwood, Oryx and Crake 85), dominates all
actions. Addicted to alcohol, cigarettes, drugs, and sex, Jimmy is in thrall to his body regardless
of the arguments his mind erects; his experience is a microcosm of prevailing human frailties.
Crake is condescending of such bodily domination, expressing his disdain both verbally,
referring to dating as “Pair-bonding” and “unproductive random scanning” (207), and through
his extinction-provoking (hemorrhagic virus) and life-form generating (Crakers) actions. Yet
even Crake finds himself subject to bodily drives and human emotions in his relationship with
Oryx; even those with the genius gene are not immune to the body’s hormone dance. Jimmy
observes “Crake had never been a toucher, he’d been physically remote, but now he likes to have
a hand on Oryx: on her shoulder, her arm, her small waist, her perfect butt” (313). He is finally
(humanly) susceptible to the bodily imperatives manifested as “love” (309).
Accepting the inescapability and necessity of embodiment unites humans as organisms with the
pre- and nonhuman, for the processes of the body on a cellular level have linkages with all
Earth’s other biota. Travel back far enough in time, and humans and others emerge from the
same single-celled organism. Embodiment and feedback systems are an indication that humans
share the foundations of their information gathering systems with other earthly organisms.
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Genetic studies have peeled back some of the mysteries associated with biological functions, and
at the same time revealed a genetic background for humanity that shares commonality with all
other organisms. 14 Gaining a deeper understanding of the biology behind human origins also
assists comprehension of human relatedness to other organisms. What makes us human is also, in
some cases, what makes the chimpanzee a chimp, makes the dog a dog, or what makes the
flatworm a flatworm. The relatedness in underlying genetic information is the key to the transspecific modifications taking place in Oryx and Crake’s Compounds.
Science fiction literature has long challenged the notion of the primacy of human physicality.
Various themes implicate either the human mind or body (or both) as limiting in nature,
embellishing evolved abilities with mental or physical improvements. Ideas such as telepathy,
teleportation, and telekinesis illustrate the limitations of existing human brain power, while
cyborg or genetic augmentation demonstrates the deficiencies in a natural, non-altered physical
condition. And these are just the human allegories: aliens, robots, and genetically modified
companion species are other examples the genre uses to point out the finite capacity of human
existence. In Clifford D. Simak’s novel City, for example, humans abandon the earth, migrating
to Jupiter to experience a superior existence as Jovian lopers: “he had found something greater
than Man had ever known. A swifter, surer body. A sense of exhilaration, a deeper sense of life.
A sharper mind.” An alien body and alien mentality is naturally superior to the human,
intimating that “the brains of Earth things” are inherently “slow and foggy” (84).

14

Lynn Margulis attests to the undergirding relationships of all life, noting that “long-chain molecules such as
DNA, ribonucleic acid (RNA), and protein permit us to study all life with a single standard of measure” (56).
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Greg Bear’s Blood Music offers another transcendent form of transformative embodiment, with
human cognition absorbed into an inhuman microscopic universe. Corporeal existence is
replaced with an all-mind consciousness; the body is no longer necessary, along with the earth
and all material existence: “Thought rises above the chemistry, the interchanges within his
cluster and the processes within his cells. Thought is the combination, the language of all
interaction” (189). As in these other examples, humans are deemed lacking in Oryx and Crake;
Crake’s perception that humans are physically maladapted to the changing environment, plus his
misanthropic judgment of human emotional and psychological behavior underlie the
development of his “children” (Atwood, Oryx and Crake 96). Possessing perfect, aesthetically
pleasing bodies, and devoid of the human characteristics he thought nonessential, the Crakers are
Crake’s gene-spliced response to humanity’s shortcomings (302).

Crakers: Genomic Posthuman Bodies
In contrast to the primacy of mind and data celebrated by informatics, Haraway points out that
“bodies are maps of power and identity” (“A Cyborg” 83); the posthuman can embrace
corporeality and celebrate the communications buried in chemical, bodily code. This is the vision
of the posthuman manifested in the Crakers. While not cybernetic organisms, the Crakers still
represent a product of both digital and organic information revolutions. They would not be possible
without the human genome project: the knowledge for restructuring their genetic makeup is
enabled by computational tools and the structures they reveal, and their creation is the cumulative
result of the knowledge gained “Once the proteonome had been fully analyzed” (Atwood, Oryx
and Crake 302). Computers provide information processing speed and are necessary for reaching
this level of understanding and calculating the masses of data contained within the genetic code.
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Without the assistance of digital technology, genetic engineering at the level of Crake’s team of
Grandmasters would be impossible, and the scientists would not be able to modify, grow, and
educate the Crakers within one lifetime. While technocrats describe “Superhumanity,” “progress,”
and “immortality” as posthuman attributes (Vinge 19), Crake’s children follow a different
posthuman path. As Ku points out, the Crakers’ hybridity confers “dominance over humans by dint
of their greater survivability” (115). They are programmed with “rapid-growth factors” and a
lifespan of thirty years, eliminating old age and infirmity, and by editing out the “foreknowledge . .
. and the fear” of death, Crake devises his own version of immortality (303). 15 They have also been
engineered to preclude material progress—an emphatically non-technocratic feature.
Although the Crakers retain an outward appearance of humanity, they are not totally human in
body or mind. Like the organisms in Blood Music, the Crakers are biologically altered rather than
technologically augmented. Bouson describes the Crakers as part of an “extended MaddAddam
joke” Atwood uses to signal the farce as well as the danger of “a bioengineered posthuman future”
(149), but the altered hominids are not humorous in themselves: any humor resides in the warped
reflection of humanity we see in them. Their strangeness arises from the animality they have
inherited from gene-splice technology, differences vested in the serious business of survival. Crake
takes most of his “invention” from adaptations already present in nature, understandings he gained
from exposure to Extinctathon. “Think of an adaptation, any adaptation,” he tells Jimmy, “and
some animal somewhere will have thought of it first” (Atwood, Oryx and Crake 164). Crake is led
into awareness through the information accessed online during the “definitive” period of his and
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At one year of age, a Craker “looks like a five-year-old,” and by four he or she will “be an adolescent.” Crake’s
rationale is that “too much time is wasted in child-rearing . . . and being a child” (Atwood, Oryx and Crake 158).
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Jimmy’s adolescence (300); while Jimmy is falling in love with Shakespeare, Crake is learning
about biodiversity loss with the Grandmasters, and assimilating the diversity which will later
manifest in the Crakers.
Adaptation itself is a feedback system, with improved survivability traits transferring to the next
generation. Feedback from one generation to the next provides information traveling
diachronically as well as from one information structure to another. Crake simply applies and
speeds up evolutionary fixes to enable more robust survival traits for the new climate the old
humanity has engendered, and to rid the species of effects he views as unnecessary or dangerous.
These include two attributes that define Jimmy’s life, but which Crake views as superfluous: a
sense of humor and sexual love (Atwood, Oryx and Crake 305-306). Physical changes include
modified digestive tracts which allow them to eat leaves, grass and caecotrophs (158-59), an
adaptation precluding hunger and thus eliminating the need for agriculture (Atwood, Oryx and
Crake Revealed). 16 With thickened skin resistant to ultraviolet damage, they do not need textiles
(Atwood, Oryx and Crake 6), and they have an “extra layer of skin on the bottoms of their feet,”
voiding the need for shoes (Atwood, Oryx and Crake Revealed). Since they are passive creatures,
the males use scent-marking with their genetically-modified urine to define their territory and keep
predators out (Atwood, Oryx and Crake 154-55). The Crakers’ sex drives are modified to eliminate
continual estrus, with cyclical reproduction taking place every third year. The mating rituals are
tightly structured; Crake’s rationale is to prevent pair bonding, doing away with jealousy, rivalry,
and sexual aggression (164-65). They do not “register skin color,” eradicating in-group/out-group

16

Caecotrophs, a modification Crake bases on “hares and rabbits,” consists of “semi-digested herbage, discharged
through the anus and reswallowed two or three times a week” (Atwood, Oryx and Crake 158-59).
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conflicts. By editing “nothing less than the ancient primate brain,” Crake aims to reconfigure
human culture. In changing the Crakers’ genetic makeup, “hierarchy,” “territoriality,” “racism,”
and sexual possessiveness are all theoretically rendered obsolete (305).
Genetically constituted of many creatures united within the human form, the Crakers thus offer
metaphoric unity: the symbiotic relationship available to humans in the schema of life on earth is
expressed in miniature within each Craker body. Humanity does not take up the challenge of
recognizing its interdependence with earth’s other biota, so Crake’s humanoid constructs must
represent the synthesis. Human singularity, the complement to humanist individualism, is a
primary fact in most human philosophy and religion. 17 But as Lynn Margulis reminds us, the
human “sense of species superiority”—the denial that we are not already part of the “Symbiotic
interaction [which] is the stuff of life on a crowded planet”—is a “delusion of grandeur” (98).
The bodies of the Crakers are merely fictional representatives of an always-already physical
reality: humans are already symbiotes dependent on multiple other specifics. The merging of life,
the transversing of species boundaries is part of our cellular history; Crake and his fellow
scientists only exaggerate and accelerate the process.

The God Complex and “Paradice”
Crake’s posthuman genetic experiment is carried out under the “Paradice” dome in the
RejoovenEsence Compound: “It had its own park around it, a dense climate-controlling
plantation of mixed tropical splices above which it rose like a blind eyeball” (Atwood, Oryx and
Crake 297). Blindness can insinuate the inability of the CorpSeCorp and the Compound
17

Haraway describes this singularity as “abstract individuation, an ultimate self untied at last from all dependency, a
man in space” (“A Cyborg” 71).

39

authorities in discerning what is really going on, as it can explain Jimmy’s state of mind. Crake’s
encapsulated paradise is the new Eden, and his experimental humans are replacements for the
worn-out race of Adam and Eve. Crake’s posthumans are not cyborgs; they do not mechanically
self-replicate, nor are they “uncoupled from organic reproduction” (Haraway, “A Cyborg” 70).
His goal is not engineering cyborgs; his ultimate aim is preservation of the biosphere by erasing
human civilization. As he explains to Jimmy, it only requires “the elimination of one generation”
to stop progress forever: “all the available surface metals have already been mined . . . Without
which, no iron age, no bronze age, no age of steel.” In the struggle for survival, knowledge
would be lost and technology that is “too complex now” would disappear, never to be replaced
(Atwood, Oryx and Crake 223). Only natural forms adapted to the environment would be able to
thrive. Crake, the mad scientist, is playing God, making the judgment of whether the rest of
humanity should live.
Crake’s disgust with humanity is mirrored in the actions of MaddAddam, God’s Gardeners, and
Amanda Payne’s two artist roommates, who explain to Jimmy the significance of the agricultural
revolution: “once agriculture was invented . . . the human experiment was doomed, first to
gigantism due to a maxed-out food supply, and then to extinction, once all the available nutrients
had been hoovered up” (242-43). 18 As Crake notes, “Homo sapiens” is not self-regulating like
other organisms; it is “one of the few species that doesn’t limit reproduction in the face of
dwindling resources” (120).

18

Atwood notes that humans have “run through 90% of the ocean fish stocks in the past fifty years” (qtd. in
Halliwell 260).
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Eliminating much of what humanist principles exalt as the human condition, Crake’s “children”
exemplify physical survival, not creative intellect. The Crakers have language, but Crake
attempts to engineer the elements a humanist would recognize: intelligence, creativity, invention,
and exploration—the “curious monkey brain”—out of the genome (Atwood, Oryx and Crake
222). The main information transfer that takes place for a Craker is on a cellular level,
communicating the animal/human gene sequences from one generation to the next. Like
Haraway’s cyborgs, the Crakers are “a kind of disassembled and reassembled, post-modern
collective and personal self” (“A Cyborg” 79).
Nevertheless, while the first-generation Crakers may be a product of digital informatics, their
children are purely biological posthumans, and they show evidence of the survival of at least one
trait by exhibiting curiosity in the post-JUVE world: the children pelt Snowman with questions
about artifacts and his appearance (Atwood, Oryx and Crake 7-8). Further signs that Crake has
not been totally successful in erasing the vestiges of humanity are apparent in a “develop[ing]
reverence” toward the mythic figures of Oryx and Crake: “They must perform some kind of
prayer or invocation . . . they’re conversing with the invisible” (157). They are also falling into a
loose hierarchy, with some individuals assuming spokesperson roles. It is too early to tell if
Crake’s fears of reformation are grounded, with tyrants and war naturally following “leaders and
the led” (155). Atwood seems to hint that some parts of the human psyche are embedded too
deeply in the genome to be easily rent: “We’re hard-wired for dreams . . . we’re hard-wired for
singing. Singing and dreams were entwined” (352).
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Crake’s attempts to distance his posthuman creations from human culture are made from a
position anchored in that very culture. The technologies that enable Compound research have
their roots in empirical scientific traditions, and as such celebrate the intellect and rationality of
Homo sapiens. The genetic manipulation taking place in the Compounds is justifiable on the
grounds of improving human health and producing commodifiable goods, but the rationale does
not extend to foretelling unintended consequences or predictable negatives. The control of
nature—the paradigm residing at the center of human progress—is enacted on an expectation of
immediate advantage. Short-term planning only takes into consideration available resources, and
as long as those resources (such as ocean stocks) can be harvested, human nature is not
motivated to change. The crumbling infrastructure of natural systems accompanying global
warming only signals a need for new sources of food, not an amendment of current activities.
This aspect of humanism highlights the utilitarian value attached to nature: the world, as such,
exists solely for human consumption.
Glover identifies the tendency toward the “objectification of nature” in Oryx and Crake as
pursuing an instrumentalist paradigm (52). Western philosophy’s embrace of this perspective has
been described by Carolyn Merchant as the “mechanistic” view, a way of thinking about nature
that escalated with the birth of the Scientific Revolution. Prior to that period, humans had
enjoyed an “organic” understanding of the earth’s processes, but “new images of mastery and
domination” in the seventeenth century “functioned as cultural sanctions for the denudation of
nature” (2). Although nature has been viewed as a wilderness throughout western history (as
evident in biblical accounts), the technological advances of Enlightenment Europe and America
provided new ways of subduing the natural wild. Not only has the Judeo-Christian God

42

“authorized human dominion over the earth” (Merchant 131), but human genius has increasingly
made possible radical domination, such as aggressive mining practices, market-based farming
technologies, and marsh and swampland reclamation (36-37, 51, 61). By manipulating natural
organisms and toying with genetic realities, the scientists and technicians of Oryx and Crake are
just following a pattern historically recognized as the human-centered, instrumental approach.
In addition to the surface purposes of increasing food sources, the pharmaceutical companies that
run the largest Compounds are responsible for creating “New and different” diseases designed to
keep money flowing “From patients to doctors, from clients to cure-peddlers” (Atwood, Oryx
and Crake 210-11). The new economy depends on disease, as a disease-free population would
not be profitable. As Crake explains, “‘The best diseases, from a business point of view . . .
would be those that cause lingering illnesses. Ideally—that is, for maximum profit—the patient
should either get well or die just before all his or her money runs out. It’s a fine calculation’”
(211). The mind—the coin of the realm in the Compounds—proves to be as corrupt as the flesh.
As the scientists pursue immoral science in search of profit, the seeds for human extinction are
already in place, managed for power and control the way other doomsday weapons (such as
nuclear missiles) have always been managed. Crake’s elegant solution completes the extinction
of humanism, along with humanity, but it is a solution grounded as much in blind reaction as
prior efforts to control nature. His evolving outlook can be determined from the changing
refrigerator magnets in his apartment, from “The proper study of Mankind is Everything” (207),
to “Where God is, Man is not” (301). His either-or approach opens the gate for a new kind of
human, while negating any chance for concert between the old humanity and nature.
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Between the empirical domain of the Compounds and the posthuman world of the Crakers lies
the landscape of Oryx and Crake‘s women actors. I will next explore the contrasting shadows of
the humanist subject in the survival experience of Oryx, as well as the standpoint of struggle
embodied by Sharon. Sharon and Oryx are separated by culture, education, race, and experience,
but their individual existences are impacted by the same humanistic constructs that exert
nomenclative control over nature, and their fates are intimately tied to corporate power,
environmental ethics and third-world politics.
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CHAPTER THREE: RESISTING WOMEN
Gendered Vision
In Oryx and Crake, both animals and humans are subject to extinction, categorization, and
genetic reconstruction. Atwood’s attention to words and naming conventions accentuates the role
language plays in constructing the reality of her near-future dystopia; from the title characters
(named after extinct animals) to the protagonist’s pet (the gentle hybrid named “Killer”),
nomenclative structures facilitate an understanding of the role masculine narratives play in
science and technology, and by extension, the natural world. For example, Extinctathon
proclaims “Adam named the living animals, MaddAddam names the dead ones,” a reference to
Adamic naming linked to Classical and Enlightenment trends of categorizing living and dead
humans as well as animals (Atwood, Oryx and Crake 80). Atwood’s use of language works to
demystify science as a cultural construct.
In response to Martin Halliwell’s comment in an interview on the scarcity of female characters in
Oryx and Crake; Atwood asserts that there are “female people,” but they are filtered through the
lens of Jimmy/Snowman’s perceptions. Sharon, Oryx, and his multiple girlfriends all add to the
feminine contingent of the narrative, and all are colored by Jimmy’s reality. The resultant twodimensional portraiture illustrates Atwood’s comment that not many men are “fully conversant
with the inner lives of women who are the objects of their affections” (qtd. in Halliwell 255).
Gendered constructions are part of a worldview founded on cultural edifices so finely layered and
stitched into our awareness that they fade into a natural, true, seamless understanding; the words
we use to express these “truths” are complicit both in constructing and maintaining the worldview.
On one level, Atwood’s presentation acknowledges the culturally constructed relationships
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between men and women, but it also provokes consideration that constructed reality extends
beyond associations with the opposite sex, and that language supports this reality. Only the
massive humanity-destroying extinction event in Oryx and Crake throws the entire fabrication into
relief, painfully prodding Snowman’s assumptions as he re-views significant events from his life.
At the narrative’s opening, Snowman’s attire consists of a tattered bed-sheet, a baseball cap, and
a shattered pair of sunglasses; the single lens of his broken glasses warns us that his vision and
memory are fragmented and tainted by imperfect understanding, while his sheet speaks of
sleeping consciousness (Atwood, Oryx and Crake 4). At the same time, half-sight can also allude
to emergent vision as Snowman begins to recognize the signs that were always present but
hidden from his pre-extinction viewpoint. With his flawed yet awakening sight, Snowman is the
sieve through which Atwood pours the narrative body of Oryx and Crake; as the word person,
Snowman echoes the language that shapes events. Sharon and Oryx appear, reappear, and
disappear within Snowman’s account, in the process revealing the humanist-empiricist roots
implicit in gendered assumptions.
Feminist readings of Oryx and Crake produce multiple perspectives. DiMarco observes that
Crake, metaphoric father to both the Crakers and the JUVE epidemic, assumes the role of “homo
faber” (171). His utilization of Oryx to first educate the Crakers, then spread the virus makes her
his tool for this instrumentalist vision, “akin to nature as the material or body that must be
manipulated in order for homo faber’s production to occur” (184). DiMarco notes that, in this
same instrumentalist paradigm of the Compounds, Sharon “self-selects herself out of doing
research,” making her “of no ‘use’” to the amoral activities taking place there (189). Fiona Tolan

46

recognizes Sharon’s ethical qualms over the genetic manipulation taking place in the Compounds
as indicative of “feminist standpoint epistemology”: the questions and challenges Sharon raises
illuminate the “history of natural science that has always held peculiar dangers for women” (27879). Oryx, meanwhile, manifests multiple roles, “incessantly self-inventing” in the context of her
sex work, as the Crakers' teacher, as a business woman, and as a goddess. Oryx’s multiplicity of
identities “seems to point to a postfeminist agency,” while her reincorporation by Snowman as
the Crakers’ nature goddess is symptomatic of “ecofeminism and spiritual feminism” (Tolan
290-91). In this section I will explore the contrasting shadows of feminism and humanism from
the standpoint of women in science, embodied by Sharon, and the survival experience,
engendered by Oryx. Through this analysis I will show how the language and technology of
western institutions shapes the fate of each.

What’s In A Name
Many labels shape Sharon’s identity: wife, Jimmy’s mother, microbiologist, former OrganInc
employee, runaway, radical protestor, and martyr. As wife and mother, she does not live up to
traditional social expectations, and her career is stymied by her emerging questions concerning
Compound ethics. The text reveals Sharon’s agency as illusion masquerading as empowerment:
she is free to be anything she wants, as long as she wants to be wife, mother, and loyal employee.
In her failure as a mother, she represents resistance to the essential nature of woman as a
maternal figure, and she is proof that mothering is not an innate capacity of the human female.
Distracted by inner moral turmoil and external situations, she is incapable of performing even
basic primary duties for her family, duties represented culturally as women’s work. In
Snowman’s memories, she is “a clear image, full color,” implying accurate sight (49), but the
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image is often of a remote woman in a magenta robe, holding onto a cigarette (31). This is a
picture projected by a needy child’s emotions, and not a vision of the complete human being,
Sharon. Young Jimmy usually has to fend for himself in making his own lunch, but the times his
mother has “a real lunch waiting for him,” he is frightened by her feigned maternal act:
“carefully dressed, her lipstick smile an echo of the jelly smile on the sandwich . . . her eyes
bluer than blue” (31-32). In attempting to adopt the expected behavior of a mother, she reveals
the growing strain of an unnatural (for her) position, and her failure expands to absent-minded
neglect topped off with “her increasingly weird smile” (50).
Sharon resists the essentialism of motherhood, and she also refuses the seductive and rewarding
masculinized science construct. Unlike Jimmy/Snowman’s fractured sight, Sharon’s eyes elicit
clarity, seeing through the naturalized paradigm. Paternalism runs deep in the Compounds; with
private educational and medical institutions, shopping malls, and piped-in entertainment via the
internet, the Compounds foster a dependency in the employees that few acknowledge or resist.
The emphasis on external danger is further psychological encouragement to remain isolated, and
if all of those incentives fail, then the exit/entry process is invasive and cumbersome enough to
dissuade travel. Rather than freedom and opportunity, the Compounds offer a gated existence
monitored and sustained by an omnipresent employer. Glover points to the “prison” of
Compound life for Sharon, a prison she must escape once “she voices her horror at the
instrumentalism practised within compound walls” (54). Sharon recognizes the danger inherent
in paternalistic provision, and the false security represented by Compound protection; she is the
voice for the ideologically pure science objectives which Compound employees relinquish for
the trappings of material prosperity. Through Sharon’s vision we understand the fabrication of
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Compound existence (27, 227). Through her resistance, we recognize the life and death power
associated with Compound science and technology.
Language is revealed as a necessary tool in establishing hierarchy in the pre-apocalypse communities
of Oryx and Crake. Within the Compounds, scientific knowledge is the regimenting factor, an
outcome of which can be seen in the prestige of the different schools. Proficiency in math and
science, such as Crake’s skill-set, ensures an education at a premium school like Watson-Crick, while
non-proficiency means a degree from a valueless school like Martha Graham.19 Key to these
transitions is the language of science, terminology coded in the Latinate nomenclature of biology and
the mathematical ciphers of chemistry. This language has deep roots in western culture, roots that
prove to be neither benign nor neutral in terms of gender, class, and race. The techno-science driving
commerce and culture in Oryx and Crake owes its genesis to the methodology and authenticity
established during the Enlightenment. Biblical claims provide the Adamic right to bestow names, but
the formalized process of identifying and categorizing the natural world is the philosophical legacy of
classical Greece, honed and refined during the Scientific Revolution. Naming and categorizing work
together to shape the empirical worldview, defining not just the object observed, but the process of
observing and the role of the observer.

19

While Oryx and Crake‘s Watson-Crick Institute represents masculine scientific priority, the narrative of the actual
search for the structure of DNA reveals a system privileging male prerogatives. According to Lynne Osman Elkin,
the effort which garnered James Watson and Francis Crick the Nobel Prize in genetics relied significantly upon the
unrewarded contributions of the chemist Rosalind Franklin. It was Franklin’s unpublished x-ray photograph #51
which inspired Watson’s revelation as to the helical structure of the molecule, although she is not cited as a source in
Watson, Crick, and Wilkins’ Nobel lectures.
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Women, Science, and Nature
Valence for the scientific method is predicated upon the assumption of objectivity, with credibility
sustained by non-questioning acceptance. Science thus construed exists outside social constructs;
its goal is simply the search for pure knowledge for the betterment of humanity. But this purity is
suspect in the very unquestioning acceptance it mandates, and in the proposition of the external,
non-discriminating viewer. As Emma Whelan observes, “The scientific method and scientific
rationality are called into question as positing an untenable view from nowhere; knowledge, the
knowing subject, and scientific and technological practices and products are themselves products
of their social, material, and discursive contexts” (544). When we question the empiricist
paradigm, we immediately perceive gendered dualisms infecting scientific processes, including
nature/feminine and nature/culture couplings; we also detect a gendered active/passive construct.
Traditional perceptions separate the masculine and feminine spheres into external (active) and
domestic (passive) areas. Because women are excluded in its Classical and Enlightenment
incarnations, science and the accompanying technology are naturalized as masculine domains.
“Science,” Londa Schiebinger argues, “is not value neutral but emerges from complex cultural
matrices”; like other institutions, science is a product of the people involved, physical location, and
era of production (74). And as science and technology are reflective of society and culture, they are
also “constitutive of cultural and social conditions” that can be appreciated as “reality-producing
and –reproducing practices” (Moser 6). The science in Oryx and Crake may take place in the midtwenty-first century and reflect and generate the social and economic expectations of that imagined
time period, but it also contains traces of earlier historical practices in its structure and language.
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To illustrate the non-innocent historical masculinization of scientific research, Donna Haraway
cites the Enlightenment-era example of Robert Boyle, “the father of chemistry” and “the
experimental way of life.” Common acceptance of unbiased scientific reporting depends on an
assumption of “public and collective” trial and proof, but the heritage of this kind of witnessing (as
seen in Boyle’s air-pump demonstrations) has been limited by both gender and class (“Modest”
224-25). Even now, “Colored, sexed, and laboring persons” encounter barriers in striving for the
“transparency” that allows “modest” witnessing. Because of perceived bias, they are “the object of
vision” rather than the viewer, and thus denied participatory agency (232-33). The controlled
atmosphere of the experimental setting, the rhetorical format of the “unadorned, factual,
compelling” reports, and the repetitive experimentation of scientific methodology all work together
to form the credibility which becomes transparent factuality, and, over time, naturalized “nondependent, disinterested truth-telling” (226, 232). In Oryx and Crake, the enduring belief in
scientific neutrality ensures a gullible customer base for corrupt corporations, and veils damaging
practices (such as disease-generating vitamins) from the view of external consumers and many of
the Compound scientists (Oryx and Crake 211). Science is thus revealed as subject to corruption
when shielded from multiple perspectives.
In addition to the form and methodology of scientific practice, science’s lexical component also
carries traces from earlier discourses. In her analysis of Linnaean nomenclature, Schiebinger
demonstrates how a scientific paradigm arising from a gendered, socially-anchored framework
can have a lasting influence on how we perceive the natural world. The labeling conventions
Linnaeus attached to mammals, for instance, supported his era’s middle-class expectations of
women’s social roles, and codified a “term, meaning literally ‘of the breast,’” to include humans
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within a category of backboned animals which also contains “apes, monkeys, cows, whales,
camels, and all other animals with hair, three ear bones, and a four-chambered heart.” Linnaeus’
system, which still prevails, has as much to do with the concerns of an eighteenth-century society
worried over “wet-nursing and maternal breast-feeding, population growth, and the contested
role of women in both science and society” as with the orderly cataloging of organic life
(Schiebinger 4-5). 20
Linnaeus’ terminology and its underlying gendered representations are still in use in Oryx and
Crake, naturalized to the point of invisibility. Extinctathon utilizes Linnaean nomenclature, and
Crake masters it in his early teens; it becomes so integral to his vocabulary that when he and
Jimmy espy Sharon in video footage of an environmental protest, Crake identifies her as
“Phylum Chordata, Class Vertebrata, Order Mammalia, Family Primates, Genus Homo, species
sapiens sapiens, subspecies your mother” (Atwood, Oryx and Crake 182). Crake’s use of the
language is rote, and neither he nor Jimmy signal an awareness of the gender significance their
parlance conveys. Atwood’s presentation of this dialogue reaffirms our expectation that science
contains its own language—separate, specific, and neutral. But the same naming convention used
to categorize the feminine by a nurturative physical characteristic—mammary glands—identifies
the masculine Homo by intellect, sapiens sapiens, subtly reifying the feminine/nature,
masculine/intellect dichotomies.

20

Cell biologist Lynn Margulis cites the “inconsistencies, contradictions, and confusions” of the nomenclative
system, and asserts the need for “one teachable scheme, an evolutionary system of classification, that reflects cell
morphology, metabolism genetics, and developmental biology” as opposed to the existing inherited system (61-62).
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The force of naturalization extends beyond appellations for biological entities, and saturates the
language, tools, and methods of science. Examining modern science, Evelyn Fox Keller asserts a
“new reading of the relations between science and nature,” one that starts “to unravel the
insidious power of discourse to generate its own forms of truth” (52). Her field of expertise is
molecular biology, the same terrain Atwood engages in her fictional universe. Keller examines
naming from the perspective of the language used in redefining biological processes of life. Her
concerns include the “Relocation of the essence” and “Redefinition of” the meaning of life, as
well as the “Recasting of the goals of biological science.” Observing from a feminist perspective,
Keller questions the reductionism narrowing the significance of life to simply “genetic material,”
and defining life as “code” to be mastered (54-55).
These concerns echo themes in Oryx and Crake, in Sharon’s accusations of “interfering with the
building blocks of life,” an intervention in which she challenges the morality of Compound
science. Jimmy’s father’s response reaffirms the real-world scientific perspective of life as
simply something to be manipulated for human use (Atwood, Oryx and Crake 57). He does not
acknowledge the webs of life of which these discrete elements are a part, nor does he recognize
the unpredictable, cumulative effects human interference can produce. His response substantiates
the reductionist lens employed by the Compound scientists in Oryx and Crake, which conceives
no harm in dissecting and appropriating the life’s underlying components; humans have broken
the code, and in doing so gained rightful mastery over nature. Morality can be shunted from the
picture and taken out of the lab, since the processes of life have been rendered into constituent
chemicals and molecules, renamed, and so repurposed.
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While naming conventions reveal the connections between science and the masculine principle,
nature and women are linked, as Carolyn Merchant observes, with “wild uncontrollable nature”
historically connected with the feminine/organic principle (127). Nature, defined in terms of
cultural projections, is linked to the female as a nurturing mother, a resource to be penetrated, a
body to be sown and reaped, or a secret to be unlocked. 21 The tradition connecting women and
nature has a long history in western thought; from the masculine/mechanical perspective, nature
is explained as a force to be brought to heel, so that her wealth can be put to use. Natural disorder
is what science and technology intend to tame, through observation, experimentation,
categorization, manipulation, and physical constraint, and woman’s affinity to nature means that
she, too, must be controlled and tamed. As Donna Haraway hints, nature is a “dangerous female
threatening manly knowers” (“Modest” 235). Nature and culture form a duality in which nature
contributes to the advancement of Western civilization by suffering degradation, a situation
regarded as progress in the mechanistic model (Merchant 143), and in a “familiar patriarchal
reduction,” the feminine is naturalized as closer to nature because of her procreative anatomy
(Sturgeon 35). Women (such as Sharon) striving for an active role in the scientific disciplines
must work against this essentialism; they must prove themselves the antithesis of naturalized
actors, and in doing so must adopt and work within a paternalistic paradigm. 22

21

Merchant describes the pre-mechanistic “metaphor of the earth as a nurturing mother” which “served as a cultural
restraint . . . One does not readily slay a mother, dig into her entrails for gold or mutilate her body” (2-3). During the
Renaissance, a still-nurturing earth could be “tamed and subdued . . . to provide both material and spiritual food”
(8). Page duBois relates the Classical Greeks used earth metaphors describing a woman’s body as a field to be
plowed or as a furrow “to receive the seeds of her husband and to nurture his crop” (39, 72), and Maria Mies and
Vandana Shiva assert the Enlightenment idea of progress was predicated on “dominance over nature, including
human, female nature” (336).
22
Noël Sturgeon defines “gender essentialism” as “arguments that unproblematically connect ‘women’ with
‘nature,’ assuming a universal essential feminine identity constructed out of biological femaleness that exists crossculturally and across racial and class structures” (115).
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The historic complexity of feminine participation in the scientific community is evident in Oryx
and Crake: the women who are involved with Compound science are either implicated and amoral,
as in the case of Crake’s nameless mother, Jimmy’s step-mother Ramona, and the “woodpecker
yodel” researcher at Watson-Crick (Atwood, Oryx and Crake 212, 175, 203); or ethically tortured
to the point of removing themselves from collusion, as in Sharon’s case (61). The women who
knowingly collaborate in Oryx and Crake’s questionable genetic interventions have assimilated
into the mechanistic worldview, knowing that to succeed in a man’s world they cannot question the
existing edifices. They “have ‘opted in,’” as Cooke observes, by “internalize[ing] the goals, truth,
and ethics of the company as their own.” Cooke links this conformity to “corporate ‘yes’ culture”
(111), but it can also be construed as representative of anyone with less power securing access by
remaining quiet. Those who do question—Sharon, Bernice (Jimmy’s first college roommate), and
the members of the radical environmental group God’s Gardeners—are perceived as irrational,
anti-social, and dangerous: Sharon is Jimmy’s “real, strange, insufficient, miserable” and “deviant
mother” (Atwood, Oryx and Crake 67, 182); Bernice is “reality-challenged in a major way” (189);
and God’s Gardeners are “some bunch of wackos” (213). Labeling dissidents justifies
establishment responses: those who go against the grain are a danger to civil society. Sharon’s
fate—execution by firing squad—is a warning against subversion, but also a warning against
challenging the semi-sacral notion of scientific progress.

The Digital Feminine
Technology, not science, serves as the key element defining Oryx. Her very presence in the
narrative is attributed to her online subjugation as a child sex-slave; without witnessing her
“performance,” Jimmy would not have become infatuated, and Crake would not have located
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and procured her. The placement of Oryx to illustrate the entwined issues of internet child
pornography and sexual slavery is heightened by her exotic appeal. She is a cipher both refuting
and supporting the idea of empowerment through sexuality, yet she is distanced from Jimmy’s
world geographically and culturally as well as by the recording eye of the movie camera. Tolan
aligns Jimmy’s fascination with Oryx with Edward W. Said’s “pleasurably distanced voyeurism”
of the Orient that the European observer enjoys, commenting that the “sense of otherness is
maintained by the unspecified eastern location and the young Asian girls being abused” (288).
Jimmy’s initial appreciation of Oryx stems from her cinematic appearance and the reality she
suddenly imposes on the “three layers of contradictory make-believe, one on top of the other”;
her ability to look “right into the eyes of the viewer” momentarily reveals the theatrical spell
implicit in such viewing (Atwood, Oryx and Crake 90-91). According to Said, western
representations of Orientalism gain power from theatricality: “the Orient is the stage on which
the whole East is confined” (Said 63). This “closed field” of the stage provides an understanding
of the Orient for westerners by westerners; the mystery associated with the landscape and people
is a construct mysterious only to its architects. The medium of the internet, combined with the
editing capacity of film, provide the perfect stage for reinscribing pre-determined illusions.
Jimmy’s resistance to Oryx’s later explanations can thus be construed as a reaction attributable to
his preordained notion of her history—he is looking for confirmation of the reality he imagined,
not an explanation of Oryx’s true experiences.
Computer and film technology act as cultural filters in Oryx and Crake to distribute packaged
reality. The screens of computer and television, digital interfaces that can be manipulated, edited,
and presented as veracity, shape Jimmy’s and Crake’s concepts of both the natural world and
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human culture. Atwood writes that the information Jimmy and Crake acquire is controlled
through technology: “What they can grasp of the rest of the world comes to them through
television and the Internet, and is thus suspect, because edited” (The Handmaid’s 517). Besides
gaming, the internet provides a venue for sexuality for the young Jimmy and Crake, but the view
it projects is linked to physical degradation and violence; sex is consumed at the same time and
in the same manner as online executions, torture, and animal cruelty.
The casual commodification of sex and violence is pervasive in Jimmy’s experience, and the
same film technology used to teach about the “copulation and growling and innards” of the
natural world is used to objectify the human body as merely a vessel for physical release. The
“animal behavior” educational videos from Jimmy’s childhood give way to graphic depictions
of sexuality, perversity, and violence delivered seamlessly and effortlessly through the
computer terminal (Atwood, Oryx and Crake 10, 82-83). Jimmy’s exposure to explicit online
content impresses him with the similarities—“If you switched back and forth” between the
violence and pornography, “it all came to look like the same event”—and leaves him “feeling
as if . . . he’d had no control at all over what had happened to him” (86-87). The vicarious
specular nature of the boys’ viewing objectifies all of the entities visible through the monitor,
and while Jimmy has visceral reactions to some of the grotesqueries, he in unable or unwilling
to cease participation. The technological interface of the computer has become, in effect, his
mode of socialization, and his ensuing perception of other genders, cultures, or creatures is
tainted by this formative period in his life.
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In an essay on the subject of porn, Atwood affirms that “a large part of the market for all kinds of
porn, soft and hard, is drawn from the 16-to-21-year-old population of young men,” and they
experience it as “an educational tool and a powerful propaganda device” (“Pornography” 426).
Her contention is that porn is not simple entertainment, but a force that actively shapes young
lives. Bouson writes that Atwood “conveys her uneasiness” with pornography by portraying “the
degradation of culture in a society where violence and pornography have become cheap, and
readily available, forms of entertainment” (143). Atwood herself notes that describing porn as
merely entertainment is problematic and misses the central question of “What’s the harm?”
(“Pornography” 425). In Oryx and Crake, we see the harm as the teenage Jimmy’s perspective
on relationships reflects his desensitization; in remembering an early girlfriend, he reveals “He
didn’t like [LyndaLee] much, but he needed to keep up with her, make sure he was still on her
list,” and contemplates “get[ting] Crake into the queue” to solidify their emerging friendship
(Oryx and Crake 73). A girl is a “something” to be used and shared, not a “someone” with whom
to have a relationship.
Jimmy first sees Oryx while he and Crake are watching a child porn site called “HottTotts” (88).
Oryx looks “right into Jimmy’s eyes, into the secret person inside of him,” provoking his first
intimation that the actors might be more than “digital clones,” and that the casual pornography he
and Crake consumed might be “wrong” and not just “entertainment, or beyond his control” (9091). Oryx provides a contradictory character in terms of feminist agendas. While Sharon’s
struggle is clear-cut resistance to a traditional patriarchal enemy, the institution of the
Compounds, Oryx’s struggles are contested with non-figured opponents: poverty, environmental
degradation, and commodified sexuality. She has fictitious names, many stories, and many faces:
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third-world peasant, child sex slave, prostitute, teacher, lover, and goddess. Oryx is multiple
versions of the feminine, originating from myriad experiences; her relationship with Jimmy only
emphasizes her synthesized identity, which encompasses rural/urban, organic/mechanized, and
metaphysical/scientific domains. Her negotiation of these dichotomies defies a westernized
version of feminism, challenging concepts of culture, race, gender, and essence. By bringing
Oryx into the location of white, westernized, scientific culture, Atwood positions her as a
contradictory vision of sexual potency and western exploitation.
Oryx’s back-story—or at least the history that Jimmy constructs for her—is one of survival. As a
small child, she is sold into sexual slavery and used by a series of pimps, pornographic movie
producers, and wealthy western customers. Her sexuality is the force that captivates Jimmy, but
this sexuality is part of her façade, a pose she adopts to stay alive, fulfill an obligation, extend
gratitude, or empathetically extend balm for a tortured soul. Even as she assures Jimmy that her
relationship with him is “for fun,” her veracity is in doubt because she also displays a willingness
to say whatever he wants to hear, “to pretend” or “make something up” (Atwood, Oryx and
Crake 313, 92). Although Oryx’s sexuality gives her an aura of agency in “the body-identified
and sex-addicted postfeminist world of the future” (Bouson 147), it is problematic. A
postfeminist appraisal of sexuality and even pornography includes
. . . the notion that femininity is a bodily property; the shift from objectification to
subjectification; the emphasis upon self-surveillance, monitoring and discipline; a
focus upon individualism, choice and empowerment; the dominance of a
makeover paradigm; a resurgence in ideas of natural sexual difference; a marked
sexualization of culture; and an emphasis upon consumerism and the
commodification of difference. (Gill 14)
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Using her sexuality to manipulate men, Oryx admits she “feel[s] strong to know that the men
thought she was helpless but she was not” (Atwood, Oryx and Crake 133), but while she learns
to maximize her survival chances through the use of sex, it does not necessarily impart agency or
power. As Tolan observes, Oryx’s sexuality is not freely hers to give, but is instead constrained
by “capitalist power structures” (290). While Oryx can be acknowledged as “one of Atwood’s
most ambiguous characters,” reflecting “something of the multiplicity of feminist responses”
within the area of sexuality and agency (286), she only appears to fit a postfeminist agenda.
Although she escapes her sex-trade past and dons a business suit and briefcase, Oryx still
reminds us of “the ‘two-thirds world’ girls and women who are being brutalized by the capitalist
global economy in sweatshops, the maid trade, and the sex trade” (Mack-Canty 164). The same
westernized global economy responsible for the altered climate and mass extinctions generates
the demand for digitized and actual sex workers, fueling the process which gives Oryx’s body a
monetary value in the first place. But while a second-wave feminist perspective might be
tempted to view her body as simply an expression “of oppression, exploitation, misrecognition,
and disrespect" (Herr 80), Oryx’s complex message asserts that sex work is her door into western
culture. Passively accepting her always-changing circumstances, she reminds Jimmy that the
men who bought, traded, and owned her ultimately made it possible for her to be with him.
Oryx’s story reveals the consequences of western apathy, ennui, and hedonism. While those with
access to material resources use science and technology to focus on vanity and the physical
appearance of eternal youth, people existing at the subsistence level are bereft of science or
technology that would help them deal with the effects of global warming; they are particularly
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vulnerable to the aftermath of climate change. Colleen Mack-Canty reveals third-world
susceptibility as an issue concerning the third-wave movement of postcolonial feminists and
ecofeminists, noting “women and their children, in particular, are severely affected by
insufficient food, the rising cost of living, declining services, and eroding economic and
environmental conditions” (165). The situation to which Oryx’s family is subject is a chain
reaction of unforeseen consequences: flooding in some parts of the globe and droughts resulting
in crop failures in others.
Atwood’s projections emphasize the unequal distribution of suffering between first and thirdworld experiences: in America, people simply move away from the flooded areas, but in Oryx’s
home country, there is no moving away from the suddenly unproductive land, and no escape
except through death or slavery. With nothing to market or eat, selling children becomes a
rational, yet dehumanizing, response. Oryx recalls as much to Jimmy, explaining that the large
family which would have been an asset in maintaining a farm becomes a liability when crops fail
and her father dies, because “if there was no man to work in the fields or in the rice paddies, then
the raw materials of life had to come from somewhere else” (Atwood, Oryx and Crake 116).
Seen as such, Oryx is subject to western excesses on every front: her family and her village are
pre-industrial, and thus not implicated in the production of greenhouse gases; furthermore, the
men who purchase and trade her use her beauty to extract money from rich westerners. Her
trajectory is shaped by what Maria Mies and Vandana Shiva term “the capitalist patriarchal
world system” which originates from and continues “through the colonization of women, of
‘foreign’ peoples and their lands; and of nature” ( 333). Oryx may thus represent the endangered
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(soon to be extinct) human species: her original community suffers from habitat loss,
environmental spoilage, and exploitation as organic commodities.

Renaming the Feminine
Oryx never presents a solid identity; we hear the name she received after her mother sold her—
“SuSu”—but never learn her birth name (Atwood, Oryx and Crake 129). When she has the
choice of her own name, it is still from a list provided by a man (Crake), and based on Crake’s
game of Extinctathon. She takes the name Oryx from “a gentle water-conserving East African
herbivore,” not understanding the Extinctathon predicate of selecting only organisms which are
already extinct (311). Her upset at discovering this rationale reveals the import she places on
self-naming; most of the appellations she carries are descriptions of how she is perceived in
society and are given by men, for men: sex slave, prostitute, and sex worker. For her to be able to
choose her own name is therefore a significant statement, an assertion of identity. Signifying that
language can liberate as well as constrain, Oryx trades sex for English lessons, the language she
associates with opportunity (255). Though she lost her first language—“the words had been
scoured out of her head”—she willfully captures new languages, understanding the power words
engender (115).
Regardless of Oryx’s attempts to establish self-definition, the perceptions of the masculine
figures in her life limit and construct her potential. Rosalind Gill notes that “Girls and women are
invited to become a particular kind of self, and are endowed with agency,” by men, but that
agency is predicated on the “condition that it is used to construct oneself as a subject closely
resembling the heterosexual male fantasy found in pornography” (152). Oryx is still at the mercy
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of the masculine forces in her life; caught between Crake’s “alpha wolf” and Jimmy’s “jackal”
positions (Atwood, Oryx and Crake 300), she is unable to become other than that which they
perceive. The image of her child-pornography, the revelation of her physical perfection, and her
naturalized femininity continue to shape her identity even after her death.
As his ideal of femininity, Oryx lives ghost-like in Jimmy’s memory. Before he meets her in the
RejoovenEsense Compound, Jimmy carries the printout from the long-ago website, measuring
all other women against her iconicity. After the epidemic, Snowman returns to his mental
construct of her, reviving her in his memory. The metaphysical manifestation of Oryx is very
real to him: “Sometimes he can conjure her up,” “he can feel Oryx floating towards him through
the air, as if on soft feathery wings” (Atwood, Oryx and Crake 110, 113). Through the lens of his
fixation, Jimmy constructs a mythology of Oryx as the mother/nature-goddess for the Crakers,
telling them the “Children of Oryx hatched out of an egg, a giant egg laid by Oryx herself,” and
reminding them to return the fish bones to the sea so “she can make other children out of them”
(96, 101). The image of the goddess, as Tolan notes, is associated with second-wave feminism
(291), but Snowman’s invocation can also be viewed as a further attempt to capture Oryx’s
essence; through imposing his own language upon her after her death, he defines who she was.
In Oryx and Crake, feminine renaming is an act of agency, an attempt at self-liberation. The act
is only partially successful: Sharon is efficacious at removing herself from the Compound life
and establishing a redefined persona—even her own son recognizes she is no longer the mother
figure he once knew—but her new identity does not protect her from execution. Oryx
accomplishes her redefinition under the umbrella of a masculine framework which requires her
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continued participation in expected behaviors. Sharon and Oryx each exhibit a different
mechanism for action: Sharon pulls away from the ethical stance of the Compounds, fighting
against the grain, and Oryx accepts and acquiesces, not questioning any of the science and
technology she witnesses, and unwittingly participating in Crake’s extinction plot for humanity.
Renaming includes reclaiming along with reconceptualizing, and in this context we return to
Adamic nominal assignments. In her short story “She Unnames Them,” Ursula K. Le Guin
allocates the ability to erase nomenclature to her feminine narrator. This nameless woman finds
“unnaming” the animals makes them appear “far closer than when their names had stood
between [her] and them like a clear barrier” (2233). The human/nonhuman separation has been
weakened by this nameless state; the possibility of both danger and knowledge is thus
unwrapped. From the creatures’ viewpoint, most “agreed enthusiastically to give their names
back to the people to whom—as they put it—they belonged,” shedding “all the Linnaean
qualifiers that had trailed along behind them for two hundred years like tin cans tied to a tail”
(2232-33). Le Guin unites the nonhuman with the feminine in this preference, showing that even
those without a voice prefer going unnamed; their identity is something better defined through
their own recognition. Sharon and Oryx find unnaming much more difficult, with not just change
of nomenclature, but loss of life seemingly the only path out of the construct. The final identity
for each exists only in the fractious, searching thoughts and memories of the last man, Snowman.
As the feminine is perceived and dominated through the lens of nature, so the natural world itself
is subject to domination. The Adamic principle assigns dominion to the sons of Adam, and the
right of people to enjoy this privilege is challenged only when humans attempt to view nature as
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a shared space. Agency depends on recognition of response, not just reaction, and even some
within the human species are denied this recognition. Those who have no voice at all—animal
others—are therefore doubly proscribed as objects, both in their silence and their difference. In
the next chapter, I will show that Atwood’s fictive portrayal of the human/nonhuman interface
invites reassessing the animal other, and reveals humanism’s expropriation of animal agency as a
matter of design and degree, not a revelation of truth.
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CHAPTER FOUR: (UN)NATURAL BODIES
Extinction and Revision
Atwood’s future scenario is not a picture of what she imagines the world will be like in a few
years, but a surmise of what it could be like if current scientific, technological, and commercial
trends continue (Halliwell 260). By extrapolating these trends into possible or even probable
outcomes, Atwood pictures a human-defined environment shorn from its natural moorings; a
world in which manipulation of nature has reached a logical, if illusionary, apex. Oryx and
Crake’s macrocosm strikes us as strange on multiple fronts—the waning age of humans, the
Mesozoic climate, and the genetically mixed-up life-forms. This alterity awakens another
thought: if the earth exists for the benefit of humanity (as perceived through religious and
humanist lenses), then what is the meaning of the world with humanity gone? Through the figure
of Crake, with assistance from his human (Oryx and Jimmy) and technological (computer and
Compound science) tools, the humanist paradigm runs into an impermeable wall, one it is
undeniably complicit in constructing.
As the narratives of extinction wend their way through the different time frames of Atwood’s
text, it becomes clear that creation and destruction are inevitably entwined. The natural systemic
transformations of evolution and extinction shape life on earth, with organic life following the
contours of geologic time and place. The scientists of Oryx and Crake deliberately insert
themselves into the natural transformations of evolution and extinction in their attempts to
control nature, following an instrumentalist tradition that holds humans outside of natural
processes. Murphy cites “individualism” as the rationale in the rejection of evolution in humans
and the persistent dichotomy separating humans and nature (144). Humanist, empiricist, and
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religious lenses legitimize humanity’s consumptive habits through self-separation from, and
ascendance over, other life forms, and evolutionary forces which propelled the human species’
success compound this perception with adaptive intelligence and tool-making skill. Humans rise
to the peak hierarchy of the great chain of being, asserting self-rationalized superiority through
material culture and technological invention that, in turn, justify mindless consumption. 23
Atwood credits William Blake with recognizing that “human imagination drives the world,”
noting that imagination now encompasses the natural world as well as the human in its effects:
“we have our hand upon the throttle and our eye upon the rail, and we think we’re in control of
everything” (“The Handmaid’s Tale and” 517). The intervention into natural evolution
accompanying human consumption is not unique to Atwood’s future, though; for thousands of
years, humans have selected and bred organisms for desired features, enacting genetic
modifications over multiple generations. In Oryx and Crake‘s technology-centered Compounds,
though, the pace has accelerated, and computers and bioscience enable gene-splice manipulation
inconceivable before the digital age. Contemporary concerns over genetically modified
organisms, or GMOS, are magnified through Atwood’s descriptions of mutated species, and
processes which took generations in prior hybridizations now take just a few years. The final
destructive potential of Oryx and Crake’s bioscience is realized in the deadly hemorrhagic virus
designed by Crake.

23

Schiebinger describes the great chain of being as a “fixed and vertical hierarchy stretching from God above down
to the lowliest sentient being.” This doctrine supported a telos of natural hierarchies underlying social hierarchies in
relation to the races of man (Schiebinger 145). I am extending it to include all creatures, sentient and non-sentient.
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In building the Oryx and Crake universe, Atwood utilizes contemporary gene studies as the basis
for her conjectures. Going far beyond GMOs for food production, she imagines biomedical and
commercial applications thrust onto a public greedy for immortality and numbed to novelty. A
few creations already exist outside fiction: the rabbit that glows neon green, and the goat that
produces spider silk in its milk. 24 Such inventions’ derivation does not fit the same mold as
historic genetic improvements such as wheat, corn, barley, and rice from wild grasses, or
milkable cows and horses from their wild kin. The altered rabbit and goat are not the result of
human-influenced intraspecific breeding practices (which are not entirely innocent either), but
mixed-species combinations. 25 Novel because of its non-natural guise, this type of production
would not occur without human intervention: the computer and syringe have replaced
reproductive union within species. Humans have graduated from simply experiencing genesis
through the naming process and progressed to engendering synthetic biological entities.
The destructive aftermath of liberated human creativity emerges in the Compounds, where
scientists produce bizarre as well as utilitarian creatures: “create-an-animal was so much fun,
said the guys doing it; it made you feel like God” (Atwood, Oryx and Crake 51). Genetic
engineering, as Regine Kollek explains, makes it “possible to overcome the barriers which
normally limit the arbitrary cross-breeding of organisms of different species” (97). The resulting
24

In a presentation at MIT in 2004, Atwood notes that her fiction in Oryx and Crake is “not pure invention . . . the
spider goat is with us today, and so is the luminous green rabbit” (Oryx and Crake Revealed). The effort to develop
a new “means of production” for spider silk led to the development of a transgenic goat which makes “beautiful,
water-soluble, authentic spider silk” in its milk (Gould 44), and artist Eduardo Kac, with the assistance of a team of
scientists, created Alba, “a transgenic artwork,” in 2000. The albino rabbit Alba, recipient of synthesized jellyfish
genetic material, glows green under certain lighting (Kac 97).
25
Inbreeding popular domestic animals such as purebred dog or cat breeds can weaken genetic diversity and lead to
inherited diseases. Donna Haraway provides an example in her discussion of Australian Shepherds; describing the
occurrence of the inherited eye disease CEA in the breed, she notes the condition was made worse by “overuse in
the 1980s of a few popular sires” (When Species 115).
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organisms are not coevolved with an environment, but outliers in the intricate web of natural
processes. Some creations, like the glowing rabbits and gentle rakunks, are perceived as benign
and even playful, while others must be destroyed as too dangerous, such as the snats, “Rats with
long green scaly tails and rattlesnake fangs,” and the cane toad-chameleon hybrid (224, 51).
Other manufactured hybrids include the wolvogs, bobkittens, and pigoons, creatures which
overwhelm the natural fauna once released from human captivity. 26 The creations with the
greatest alterity, though, are the hybrid humans Crake engineers as humanity’s successors,
beings exhibiting multiple nonhuman characteristics from their animal kingdom genetic donors.
The ultimate eugenics experiment, the Crakers embody an anti-humanist rationale, with survival,
not culture, their dominant trait.
While J. Brooks Bouson views the “transgenic species” in Atwood’s menagerie as a mockery of
genetic engineering and the contemporary debate over the ethics and ownership of genetic
potential (140), Grayson Cooke perceives “rhetorical glee” in the blitz of inventive names
Atwood assigns, language defining the novel’s “fully altered” and “fully alterable world” (109).
The genetically modified creatures of Oryx and Crake, as Danette Dimarco points out, represent
the natural world’s instrumentality in the hands of scientists such as Crake, material
representations “grounded repeatedly in a violation of nature.” She calls attention to Crake’s
emphasis on human ingenuity while he concurrently deemphasizes nature’s originary importance
(181-82). Similarly, Jayne Glover notes that scientists playing God have “been blamed for the
objectification of nature—thus leading to the use of nature as instrument or object” (52). Even
the originary value of humans is called into question in the humanoid Crakers; they and the
26

Eschewing Linnaean tradition, Atwood names her hybrid imaginary creatures instead with descriptive amalgams.
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pigoons trouble what Chung-Hao Ku describes as “the fine line between humanity and
monstrosity,” challenging “what it means to be human in the age of transgenics” (109). I
propose that Atwood’s text also challenges the idea of natural hierarchical order and human
exceptionalism, and that, through Oryx and Crake’s un-natural selection, opens a conversation
on human-animal relationships, responsibility and non-human sentience.

Biophobia
As noted in chapter one, Oryx and Crake’s environs exacerbate human/nature estrangement, a
factor made explicit in Snowman’s attitude toward the post-epidemic jungle-like ecology. His
daily ritual includes contests with the biting insects and vigilance against “scales and tails”
(Atwood, Oryx and Crake 4); the untamed world offers few chances at transcendent communion.
Brief occasions hint at Snowman’s dormant biolphilia, such as his experiencing “a sudden,
inexplicable surge of tenderness and joy,” an “irrational happiness” while watching a caterpillar.
Snowman’s biophilic experience with the caterpillar brings the conjecture that it is aware of his
presence: “Maybe it’s smelling him, picking up on his chemical aura.” He notes “There will
never be another such moment of time, another such conjunction,” but he then discounts the
experience as “probably a vitamin deficiency” (41). His willingness to place this experience on a
par with his starvation-induced hallucinations indicates that, though he is immersed in it,
Snowman is not comfortable with nature.
Because of the child Jimmy’s empathic response to the burning pile of infected livestock,
DiMarco posits his “potential to see himself as connected with nature” (188), but the moments of
empathy are overshadowed by disengagement, fear, and resentment. Snowman’s tree residence is

70

a response to the biting ants, nuisance rakunks, curious pigoons, and hungry wolvogs; he even
perceives the crawling “Beetles, flies, bees” as regarding him as “dead meat” (38-39). His primal
response is situated in terms of survival against both naturally-occurring organisms and creatures
which do not share a co-evolutionary path with humans. Those that do share a partial companion
species bond with humans, such as the wolvogs, have been transformed by science into
perversions of their originary stock. “Gazing at Jimmy with eyes of love” and “wagging their
tails,” the wolvogs trigger Jimmy’s desire for a pet, but they merely mime affection; in actuality,
“bred to deceive,” they embody human duplicity (205). As Snowman muses, “It hasn’t taken
much to reverse fifty thousand years of man-canid interaction,” only the instrumental approach
of human creativity (108).
The one living, breathing creature to which young Jimmy becomes attached is his pet rakunk,
Killer, a “clean animal, with a nice disposition” (Atwood, Oryx and Crake 51). Jimmy’s name
for Killer is an act of rebellion against his mother, Sharon, but it is also an oppositional
appellation for the “placid” little animal. Killer is a human construct, a skunk without the odor,
and a raccoon without destructive tendencies; she is an example of nature for human purpose,
altered, tamed and subdued. Regardless of Killer’s lineage, Jimmy “fell in love with it”
immediately (51), affirming that gene-spliced, bio-engineered beings also merit a place in the
ethical discussion. 27 Killer, “His secret best friend,” provides Jimmy with unconditional
affection and acceptance; she is “the only person he could really talk to” (59). Sharon’s
27

Kac notes Alba, the “GFP Bunny,” is “like any other rabbit” in sociability. She needs “interaction through
communication signals, voice and physical contact” (99). His art project is an exploration of human/nonhuman
relationships, and the ethical, political, and social ramifications of genetic manipulation, and he points to Alba in
asserting “transgenic animals are normal creatures that are as much part of social life as any other life-form and thus
are deserving of as much love and care as any other animal” (100).
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disappearance signals the loss not just of Jimmy’s mother, but his beloved pet as well; he mourns
both “for months” (61).
Interestingly, Snowman shares none of young Jimmy’s affection for rakunks, describing the
“annoyingly large population of them” living in close proximity to him, and their tendency to
“nos[e] around him as if he were already garbage” (61, 38). The appearance of one of the
animals covertly observing him triggers the response that “If he worked at it, if he really tried, he
could probably tame one” (49), but it is an opportunity he does not pursue. Snowman’s
reluctance to engage with the rakunk might be taken as symbolic of his larger rejection of nature:
the creature which brought him so much happiness as a child is now just another annoyance in
the untamed wilderness. Even the dogs that lose their masters to the epidemic, the “woebegone
house pets . . . begging with bewildered eyes to be taken in by some human, any human,” fail to
get past Snowman’s resistance, and are rejected as “useless to him” (108).

Voiceless Properties: Animal Justice
From an ecocritical perspective, Atwood’s text opens up multiple questions of ethical animal
treatment, including our knowledge of what we eat and how it is produced. When Snowman
recalls his childhood, he remembers he “thought of the pigoons as creatures much like himself.
Neither he nor they had a lot of say in what was going on” (24). Both suffer from a lack of
agency, a lack of voice: the pigoons as silent animals, and Jimmy as the powerless witness to
his parent’s dysfunction. The pigoons, used as organ banks, are developed “to grow an
assortment of foolproof human-tissue organs in a transgenic knockout pig host” (22). The
pigoons are not intended for use as a food source because “no one would want to eat an animal
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whose cells might be identical with at least some of their own” (24). Nonetheless, suspicions
exist because of the first generation’s single-use nature: harvesting organs requires killing
pigoons. When Compound employees in the staff cafeteria refer to the pork dishes available on
the menu by joking about “Pigoon pie again,” young Jimmy is disturbed; his intuitive kinship
with the pigoons renders their consumption akin to cannibalism (24). Later, as he slowly
starves, Snowman envisions “a pigoon feast,” accepting the taboo of potential cannibalism as a
means of “Bring[ing] home the bacon” (150-51).
Wendell Berry recognizes “that food is a cultural product,” and “A healthy culture . . . clarifies
our inescapable bonds to the earth and to each other” (43). Corporatized farming methods
commoditize food culture, and sever the natural bonds of which Berry speaks. 28 Atwood takes
industrial agriculture methods to the logical extreme with “ChickieNobs,” an assembly-line all
breast-meat chicken that reduces the animal to just the muscle tissue humans find tasty.
“ChickieNobs” are developed to offset protein shortages brought about when existing industrial
farming is impacted by climate change and overpopulation. At the Watson-Crick Institute,
Jimmy witnesses “a large bulblike object . . . covered with stippled whitish-yellow skin. Out of it
came twenty thick fleshy tubes, and at the end of each tube another bulb was growing” (Atwood,
Oryx and Crake 203). The removal of the head and brain in what Donna Haraway terms “organs
without organisms” is intended to allay concerns over suffering (When Species 268), but even
the Compound-born Jimmy calls “The thing . . . a nightmare” (Atwood, Oryx and Crake 202).
Nevertheless, he eventually bypasses his reservations on eating the end product, later remarking
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Industrial farming challenges ethical understandings of human relationships with the animal other, and using
“animals as machines,” as Berry points out, also “creates an enormous pollution problem” (62).
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“the stuff wasn’t that bad if you could forget everything you knew about the provenance” (242).
As in his internet viewing habits, Jimmy illustrates the mindless consumption of which humans
are capable, and his easy participation in a cycle which he himself found abhorrent at first is an
indictment of human lassitude in the face of natural dissolution.
Raising the question of human responsibility with his analysis of “the animal,” Jacques Derrida
notes that the last two hundred years have seen exponential increases in our attempts to separate
ourselves from the not-human (“The Animal” 393-94). We strive for disengagement through and
because of the technology of industrial/post-industrial culture, to serve contemporary human
demands. Derrida asserts this separation occurs through modernized, mechanized farming;
industrial methodologies in animal meat production; processes such as artificial insemination and
genomic manipulation for over-production; and the commercial use of animals for “all sorts of
other end products” for “the so-called human well-being of man” (394). Kate Rigby adds to the
discussion by stressing the “ecocidal” effects of “The hyperseparation that segregates the human
other from other others,” and calling for “an ecological ethics, in which we are accountable to
more than only human others” (176). Accountability is not merely a question of how we treat
nonhuman entities, but how we acknowledge our own human existence in relation to the ecology
of the biosphere. In Oryx and Crake, Atwood illustrates that, while maintaining human
separation from natural processes allows us to ignore such ramifications for a while, ultimately
we must face our ties to the physical earth. Decisions reached from a stance of separatism or
human exceptionality, such as manufacturing organ-donor pigs which must be sacrificed for
human use, only examine ethical action from the narrow perspective of the human.
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By juxtaposing Extinctathon’s vanished natural species against bio-engineered organisms,
Atwood makes clear that if a creature is useful or profitable to humans, it need not fear
extinction—only utilitarian appropriation. 29 Haraway suggests the terminology “‘endangered
species’” works “simultaneously to locate value and evoke death and extinction in ways familiar
in colonial representations of the always vanishing indigene,” and she situates “the colonized, the
enslaved, the noncitizen, and the animal” in the same discursive space (“Encounters” 100). Thus,
the genetically modified organisms in Oryx and Crake are just the next-generation slaves, the
voiceless properties in the Compound-plantations. Their utility to humanity establishes their
valuation, a judgment enacted by humans and bypassing other considerations such as integrity of
natural ecosystems or animal subjectivity; their disappearance, even at the hands of humans, can
be returned to the natural world for absolution. While grave quantities of non-utilitarian natural
species are allowed to disappear under the thrust of development and progress, pigoons and
ChickieNobs pervade pre-JUVE Compound life. Atwood’s text informs that extinction is never
that easy to justify, and human exceptionalism is no longer a blind we can hide behind. Oryx and
Crake questions if extinction is a more serious condition when it threatens the human, as
opposed to the nonhuman, and if the idea of justice applies to the nonhuman other.

Listening to the Animal Other
Cary Wolfe offers that Derrida utilizes the notion of “shared embodiment, mortality, and
finitude” with nonhumans as criteria that “subsume the more traditional markers . . . such as the
29

Haraway observes that a lifestyle that “avoid[s] eating or wearing any animal products” in an effort to promote
environmental ethics might unintentionally “consign most domestic animals to the status of curated heritage
collections or to just plain exterminism” (When Species 80). This observation recognizes the economic imperatives
of monoculture, or reducing livestock or crops to the most productive, profitable strain. Berry notes that the decline
of “agricultural stability through diversity” has resulted in a system where “it is now, for the first time, deemed
provident and wise to put all the eggs in one basket” (36).
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capacity for reason, the ability to enter into contractual agreements or reciprocal behaviors”
(“Flesh and Finitude” 8). 30 Human exceptionalism depends on understanding the human as
possessing qualities and capabilities unique to our species, attributes such as speech, problemsolving, or empathy that present an insoluble barrier to the nonhuman other. 31 But is the barrier
impermeable or only unfathomable? If we drop the lens of humanism in our approach to the
animal other—something I propose Atwood accomplishes in Oryx and Crake—will we discern
an entity rather than a thing on the other side of the divide?
Communication is one of those markers of separation, but it is an element which can and has
been challenged. The “différend,” according to Jean-François Lyotard, is instability in language
“wherein something which must be able to be put into phrases cannot yet be,” and he includes
“silence,” the “negative phrase” within this concept (13). Bill Readings interprets Jean-François
Lyotard’s usage of “différend” to explain the idea of a language/communication barrier so great
it will never be breached (114). 32 Readings explains the failure of the colonial Australian
government to achieve justice with the aboriginal population through différend: the aboriginal
view of the world is so alien to western ways of understanding that there are no words to close
the gap (112, 120). Any words the government might use to interpret will only reassert colonial
preconceptions. And the western view is just as alien to the aborigine; despite protests to the
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According to Wolfe, to question “the ontological and ethical divide between humans and non-humans” and seek
right action for the nonhuman leads us into the region of posthumanism (“Flesh and Finitude” 8).
31
Franz de Waal’s primate studies look beyond strictly behaviorist paradigms and into empathic evidence: “group
specific behaviours,” those actions which present evidence of a “collective mindset and shared knowledge in a
group.” Other animals, such as “hyenas, dolphins, or wolves” also provide examples of nonhuman social
relationships (de Waal and Thompson 48, 44). These developing recognitions of nonhuman emotive and cognitive
potential further shake the inviolate humanist claim on uniqueness.
32
While Lyotard analogizes that “the animal is a paradigm of the victim” for their lack of speech, he is not
concerned with the différend between human and animal, but between human and human (28).
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contrary, humanism is only universal to those enculturated to it. The barrier of différend is
mutual, and prevents either party from recognizing the other as responsive entity.
I assert the absent phrase or word of the différend also describes the broken discourse between
humans and animal others. Historically, human minorities have been treated as not-human
frequently enough to show the relevance of différend; animals have suffered because the
différend between “us” and “them” is even greater. If it is difficult to achieve mutual
communications between different groups of humans, is there any hope of understanding the
nonhuman? If the indigene has such a disparate response and relation to temporal and physical
reality, how different, then, must it be for creatures with divergent sensory organs? To be human
is to be immersed in and defined by language as we understand it, communication composed of
sound, gesture, and facial expression. But other creatures use different sensory apparatus for
intraspecific communion, including, for some species, infrared vision, scent and body language,
chemical markers, or hearing that extends into registers beyond human perception. 33
Atwood illustrates the gap between human and animal communications with Alex the parrot. 34
As a child, Jimmy comes across Alex in an educational video; in his loneliness he turns to the
parrot as a kind of mascot. Alex creates a new word, “cork-nut,” to describe an almond. Jimmy,
grasping the significance of the event, adopts the word as his personal slang. Alex also cuts off
the experiment when he gets tired of it: “I’m going away now” (54). Jimmy knows if he had the
33

Butterflies, for example, locate their food sources in flowers by “pinpoint[ing] pollen and nectar . . . by the pattern
of ultraviolet rays reflected off the petals” (Wilson, Consilience 46), and Louis M. Herman posits that bottlenosed
dolphins are flexible communicators, and should be seen as “ multi-modal animals, interfacing with their world
through vision as well as hearing and echolocation” (277).
34
Alex the parrot was an actual subject in a study on animal behavior in language; while he did not use the word
“cork-nut,” he did exhibit an understanding “that his labels are made of individual phonological units that can be
recombined in novel ways to create novel vocalizations” (Pepperberg 3).
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chance to meet Alex, “they’d be friends, they’d be brothers” (261). Alex seems to be attempting
human language for the purpose of closing the gap, but we see no complementary effort on the
part of his human handler. Jimmy’s fascination with words—human communication—is the link
that draws him to Alex; the door to understanding opens with a creature that approaches, even
peripherally, human forms of verbal signifiers.
In his critique of Lacan’s Cartesian approach to the subjectivity of the animal, Derrida asserts
that the monolithic judgment on animality or humanity hinges on symbolic communication.
Whereas Lacan differentiates between “signs for human language” and “animal coding,” Derrida
challenges that the divergence is not so cleanly marked; the attributes of human language, such
as signs that create meaning, “must be accorded to any code, animal or human” (“And Say”
126). From another perspective, Murphy demonstrates the challenges faced even when both
parties speak the same human language, but are of different genders. He queried his students on
differing approaches to communicating with the opposite sex, and found the women more
inclined to put forth the “active listening” effort to understand the “many realms of male
discourse” (157-58) than men in a reciprocal situation. Murphy asks, “Is it the nature of
language, of gender, or of a particular culture that generates asymmetrical structures of
understanding difference? And if so many men are unwilling to learn the discourses of the other
side of their own species, what about that of other species?” (158). Might the words and phrases
in the animal others’ separate worlds not only exist, but exist in complex, non-instinctive forms
beyond human notice or comprehension?
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While human exceptionalism presupposes the divide, in Oryx and Crake the lines between
human and not-human blur, becoming permeable. Lacking tongues and opposable thumbs,
pigoons cannot produce words or even gestures; nonetheless, it’s not only possible, but probable
that they share human intelligence because of the human brain tissue mixed into their genetic
design. 35 Snowman describes them as “A brainy and omnivorous animal,” as they coordinate
their movements to entrap and ambush him in several instances (Atwood, Oryx and Crake 235,
267, 271). Snowman is witness to the pigoons’ capacity to plan and organize, but here the
différend is complicated by the overturned predator/prey relationship. As he observes,
“pigoons have long memories,” and their interest in him has little to do with curiosity; rather,
Snowman imagines they see him as “a delicious meat pie just waiting to be opened up.” Their
self-directed behavior is indicative of agency, though, and challenges an anthropocentric
reading. Pigoons, as “Team players,” are a rebuttal to the Cartesian machine animal (234, 268).
The Crakers also play a part in demonstrating différend; as shown in chapter one, their language
is disjointed from past cultural and physical realities. Snowman’s conversations with the Crakers
are full of broken dialogue, as misunderstandings and questions proliferate. A simple slang
expression from Snowman—“Piss off”—produces an untranslatable moment: “He’s made a
mistake, he’s said a new thing, one that’s impossible to explain” (Atwood, Oryx and Crake 9).
Predominantly human in form, the Crakers are completely other in their communication and
perception of the environment. Maybe the différend is simply too great a barrier to overcome. As
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Describing the pigoons, Snowman notes that “if they’d had fingers they’d have ruled the world” (Atwood, Oryx
and Crake 267).
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Readings asserts, “the radical incommensurability between the two kinds of arguments” assures
that neither party can even “recognize the other as an ‘argument’ at all” (115).
The “universal dream” of western humanism (Readings 116) that segregates us inter-specially by
race and geography also demands that the nonhuman be separated into a space of utility. Thus,
the moral implications of genetically manipulating other species to increase their worth to
humanity are rationalized through their anotherness. Ironically, the same science that promises
human mastery over nature also reveals the connections humans share with the natural world,
and call into question humanity’s current relationship with that world. As Glen A. Love states,
recent scientific studies and findings deepen and complicate our understanding of
the subject far beyond the simple categorizations of the past. We are increasingly
led to the borders of our species, where, for example, we share over ninety-eight
percent of our genetic makeup with the common chimpanzees, and where the
ecological fascination with such edges is increasingly evident. (572)
Atwood shows the ease with which scientific and commercial interests can ignore such
biological enlightenment, to the detriment of all.
Atwood exposes GMO technology as double-edged, as Crake performs the same cross-species
alterations on the human animal that the other scientists are performing on pigs, chickens, and
multiple other species. New understandings of the chemical and molecular connectivity of
earthly organisms increasingly reveal human entanglement with the environment, and the
artificial barriers of reason and speech fade in importance against the overarching struggle for
survival witnessed in Oryx and Crake. In the conclusion, I will return to the concepts of
extinction, evolution, estrangement, and affinity: Atwood’s platform in her grave new world.
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CONCLUSION
Man, introverted man, having crossed
In passage and but a little with the nature of things this
latter century
Has begot giants; but being taken up
Like a maniac with self-love and inward conflicts cannot manage his hybrids. (1-6)
Robinson Jeffers
“Science”
Man is but a part of the fabric of life—dependent on the whole fabric for his very
existence. As the most highly developed tool-using animal, he must recognize that
the unknown evolutionary destinies of other life forms are to be respected, and act
as gentle steward of the earth’s community of being. (91)
Gary Snyder
“Four Changes”
Lab Animal
In Oryx and Crake, Atwood places humans in the position of the laboratory animal, as much a
product of science and technology as the plants and animals we use and consume. In this, she
recognizes and magnifies the fact that our domesticated hybrids have shaped humans and human
culture just as we have shaped the organic world; coevolution has concurrently influenced
human nature and Mother Nature. Jared Diamond outlines this concept in Guns, Germs, and
Steel, explaining how higher food yields, concentrated populations, increased birth rates, and
food surpluses made possible “settled, politically centralized, socially stratified, economically
complex, technologically innovative societies” (89, 92). The evolutionary changes we have
produced in others have shaped us as well, and the fictive alterations Atwood projects have
similar, if more violent and drastic, effects on future humans.
Atwood’s text fits what Rigby describes as “biting, stinging words of prophetic imagination,”
(178), an unnerving vision of a “not-so-distant-future . . . world currently feared by
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environmentalists” (Glover 52). We react to the dangerous hybrids from the Compound labs
much like Jimmy, with revulsion and confusion, yet these biological perversions echo the
cultural perversions Atwood puts forth in internet porn and violence, human slavery, and
authoritarian justice. Even the celebration of humanist triumphs in literature, music, architecture,
and art falls on the losing side in the video game Blood and Roses, portending humanity’s future.
However, the most disturbing elements in Oryx and Crake may be those with a hint of
familiarity, such as the internet games, corporate greed, animal abuse, and social constructs of
race and gender that reflect the contemporary world: the wolvog, CorpSeCorp officer, and our
contemporary banking crisis are all products of a culture that condones corporate greed.
Bioengineered evolution as a malleable, controllable life process leads to extinction in the same
vein; the God complex manifested in Crake and his fellow Compound scientists produces both
creative and destructive outcomes. Crake, who believes in neither God nor Nature, valorizes
human creativity and unabridged progress in his Watson-Crick phase, but later observes that “As
a species we’re in deep trouble, worse than anyone’s saying” (Atwood, Oryx and Crake 206,
295). The terminology “as a species” reaffirms humanity’s ties to other organisms, and imputes a
biological problem (and possibly a biological solution). In Crake, though, the confusion of
human exceptionalism and nihilistic cynicism produces the lethal effect of narrow empirical
androcentrism, as his inventiveness provides only extinction as a logical solution to planetary
survival: “You’ve got to work with what’s on the table” (293). As Cooke notes, “Crake is a
biological determinist, believing also in a logical biology, a biologic of sense” (119). For Crake,
an elegant solution is logical and linear, never organic or rhizhomic. Speaking of the construction
of the Crakers, Crake tells Jimmy “It was the result of a logical chain of progression” (Atwood,
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Oryx and Crake 302), extending Atwood’s concerns about “single-issue, single-focus thinkers”
(Atwood, qtd. in Halliwell 260). In Crake, Atwood illustrates the double edge of science, the
capacity for comprehension that can be subverted by egoistic drive and commercial profit.
Technoscience thus portrayed is a seductive virulence, a human creation capable of trivializing
all other human creations.
The women of Oryx and Crake further highlight the suspect uses to which science and
technology are applied. Acknowledging the troubled history of exclusion and essentialism in
women’s relationships with science, Sharon and Oryx provide ambiguous hints of feminist
agency in Atwood’s dystopia. Both can be seen as figures enjoining nature with technology.
Oryx is born in an Asian village surrounded by parched farms, the forest, and wild creatures, yet
she ends her story in a Compound, Atwood’s symbol for corporate technological/scientific
elitism. Traveling from one extreme—third-world poverty and sexual slavery—to another—the
privileged inner sanctum of the RejoovenEsense Compound—she becomes associated with the
most complex forms of biotechnology yet, the humanoid Crakers and the JUVE pathogen.
Sharon, in contrast, begins her story within the elite environs as a microbiologist working for the
OrganInc Compound, and escapes to enact radical environmentalist protests against commercial
perversions of the science she helped to create.
The characters of Sharon and Oryx are exercises in defining and redefining the feminine; the
contested authority of claiming an identity frames both of their experiences, although they each
have disparate concerns and goals. Sharon, as the doomed voice of ethical science, and Oryx, as
the elusive exotic, challenge any notion of future egalitarianism; as Tolan observes, Atwood

83

“relinquishes the hope for a future generation of unified women” she displayed in earlier works
(282). In discarding this vision, the machinations of corporatized empiricism become apparent, a
commoditized perspective reducing all entities to a profit/loss valuation. The feminine,
inherently linked to nature, is pictured as both tool and raw material in the world of Compound
science. Sharon’s and Oryx’s individual deaths are mirrors to the larger cultural and species
extinctions taking place in Oryx and Crake; their victimization to patriarchal motives of greed
and control echoes the natural world’s exploitation by a humanist vision of progress.
In viewing humans as apart from nature, Crake represents a common scientific trap, forgetting or
ignoring that, regardless of the control they are exerting or the environmental damage they are
causing, humans are part of the biosphere. “Crake’s logic,” Glover recognizes, “seems valid: if
humans are responsible for destroying the world, then it makes sense to alter humans radically in
order to ensure this destruction can no longer continue” (54). But Crake’s answer to human
overpopulation, the JUVE epidemic, aims for cultural extinction as well as human extinction.
Knowledge of literature, art, music, architecture, and even technology will disappear without any
hope of rebuilding (Atwood, Oryx and Crake 223). The devolution of artistic culture, already in
progress prior to the epidemic, is as devastating to the human animal as the JUVE virus. Jimmy,
the word person, is already an evolutionary dead end in the pre-JUVE future world, and Ku
questions whether “the rejected, despised, outcast Snowman,” ostracized from his own society
for technological lack, is “still a human being at all?” (111). Is the human still human when
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stripped of language and culture, or, as Cooke avers, is it impossible to “separate the human from
the technical” (108)? 36
After the plague, Snowman—the visible example of deteriorating humanity—is cut off from the
things with which he self-identified, the “imaginative structures” that define “human meaning”
(Atwood, Oryx and Crake 167). Ku asserts that the transgenic constructs of pigoons and Crakers
“disrupt or perhaps topple Snowman’s human status” (111), while DiMarco contends Snowman
is “in a position of being able to reinvent a future world . . . one that may or may not be more
attentive to caring for others” (187). Perhaps Jimmy/Snowman’s ambiguous presentation is
Atwood’s means of calling our attention to technology’s invasive degradation of cultural
artifacts, a warning that more than just organic entities are going extinct. The “gnawed bones and
old bricks and ossified shit” that encroach artistic products for archaeological significance; the
“erosion” of art, music, literature, and dance at the Martha Graham Academy; and the
disappearance of words all signal contemporary clues (Atwood, Oryx and Crake 167, 187, 195).

Human Re-Vision?
In contemporary culture’s rush to achieve technoscientific nirvana, the assumption of human
hierarchical prominence is often taken for granted. Atwood deconstructs this assumption by
introducing others who fill the void opened by humanity’s extinction. Ku affirms “the pigoons’
and Crakers’ mimicry of human beings . . . disrupts this ranking system,” as the demise of
humanity “enables the highly adaptable pigoons and the extremely refined Crakers to dethrone
the merely ‘human’ Snowman” (112). Human exceptionalism in the absence of material culture
36

Wilson suggests “genetic evolution” runs along a “parallel track of cultural evolution,” and that “the two forms of
evolution are somehow linked” (Consilience 130).
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proves to be a hollow claim for Snowman, and “Life Skills” adapted to a technological world do
not easily translate into survival skills in a globally-warmed, post-apocalyptic setting (Atwood,
Oryx and Crake 42). The image of a bug-bitten Snowman, unshaven, unbathed, clad only in a
dirty sheet, broken sunglasses, and baseball cap, is a stark physical contrast to the “amazingly
attractive” Crakers (8). Furthermore, “lost in the fog” and drunk on bourbon (237-38), Snowman
is nearly outmatched by the “Alert . . . on the lookout” pigoons (270).
“Modernist versions of humanism and posthumanism alike,” contends Haraway, owe ideological
allegiance to the divisions “between what counts as nature and as society, as nonhuman and as
human” (When Species 9). Thus, efforts to cast pigoons and Crakers as posthumanist figures
become problematic. Although pigoons share human organs, a feature Ku relates as
“exchangeability” (113), and coordinate their behaviors in social groups, they still appear to us as
nonhuman and of nature, not society. And while the Crakers may look like “a superhuman race”
(Ku 115), their lack of common history and language, as well as their alien alimentation,
reproduction, life span, and self-defense mechanisms, mark them as other. As Glover notes,
“Crake thus takes a variety of features from the animal kingdom and designs a human that
appears closer to nature, yet is ironically the product of a laboratory experiment” (55). The
ambiguity of the Crakers’ complicated origins reanimates Jimmy and Crake’s old discussion: are
they real or fabricated? And if they are real, are they human?
Crake relates to Jimmy that the Crakers “were perfectly adjusted to their habitat, so they would
never have to create houses or tools or weapons, or, for that matter, clothing. They would have
no need to invent any harmful symbolisms, such as kingdoms, icons, gods, or money” (Atwood,
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Oryx and Crake 305). This deliberate attempt to deconstruct human culture is undercut by
Crake’s own latent humanism, though; for all Crake’s attempts to undo the humanist paradigm
through physical alterations, residual evidence of cultural construction can be found in the
Crakers. Bouson states that Crake uses appellations such as “Abraham Lincoln, Leonardo da
Vinci, Madame Curie, Sojourner Truth . . . because it amuses him” (151), but it can also be seen
as lingering cultural debris seeping into Crake’s Adamic role. The new humans in the new world
will begin their communities with names salvaged from pre (for them) -history.
The Crakers also remain suspect because of the enduring trace of human exceptionalism. Their
bipedal locomotion and overall physical appearance, combined with basic human speech and an
arguably human brain, locate them within anthropocentric expectations. The vanity of their
creator, Crake, is evident in their green eyes, and the rest of their form follows aesthetic ideals,
notwithstanding the extras he incorporated as survival insurance. As Snowman relates, they are
“perfect, each one a different skin colour—chocolate, rose, tea, butter, cream, honey,” and “they
were so beautiful . . . Each individual was exquisite” (Atwood, Oryx and Crake 8, 302). If
anything, Crake has merely extrapolated and codified species vanity for eugenic perfection.
Through his actions, Atwood shows the futility of deconstructing humanism from a standpoint
that has been saturated with humanist ideology from its inception.
In a question conceived before the advent of transgenic manipulation, Berry asks “How much
can we ‘modify’ the environment before we fatally ‘modify’ ourselves?” (205). The answers
Atwood proposes are not reassuring; posing environmental, cultural, physical, and mental
alterations, she illustrates the fragility of the construct called human. Contemporary worries over
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GMOs are extrapolated into alarming scenarios with Oryx and Crake’s wolvogs, pigoons, snats,
and bobkittens, and the manipulation of the human genome raises questions of when, and how,
will we stop?
Atwood ends the novel on an equally opaque note, with Snowman’s discovery of other human
survivors. Three strangers are camped on the beach, but by now, despite his desperate loneliness,
Snowman finds these humans embody the unknown: the other. Confused and afraid, the thoughts
that come to him are
Images from old history . . . sidebars from Blood and Roses: Ghengis Khan’s
skull pile, the heaps of shoes and eyeglasses from Dachau, the burning corpsefilled churches in Rwanda, the sack of Jerusalem by the Crusaders. The Arawak
Indians, welcoming Christopher Columbus with garlands and gifts of fruit,
smiling with delight, soon to be massacred, or tied up beneath the beds upon
which their women were being raped. (366)
Quite aware of his responsibility to the Crakers, he is faced with his unfortunate understanding of
human nature; while the strangers portend a mystery, he can easily project their destructive potential.
The once half-sighted Snowman has taken off his sheet and sunglasses, and awake, with clear vision,
he approaches his “zero hour” encounter (374).
Atwood’s deliberately ambivalent closure—the narrative ends before Snowman makes his
move—invites participation from the reader. The open ending can be construed as a promise of
renewed humanity or a new beginning (Cooke, DiMarco, Ku); it can also be seen as a warning
against technoscientific vanity and the dangers of transgenic experimentation (Bouson, DiMarco,
Glover). I agree it is a warning, an example of Rigby’s call to prophetic imagination: now we
may be implicated in our own extinction, not just from a misanthropic Crakish genius, but from
our neglect and abuse of the living earth. In addition, though, Atwood is asserting the biological
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human, and through her discourse on evolution and extinction, establishing humanity as a part
of, not apart from, the organic mix.
In 1978, Dr. Paul Abell uncovered a fossilized set of footprints in Laetoli, Tanzania, evidence of
at least two hominids who walked across the wet sand of a lake shore “between 3.6 and 3.8
million years” ago (White 175). The footprints are attributed to Australopithecus afarensis, a
“geographically and ecologically widespread, bipedal, megadont, small-brained hominid species
lineage” (White, et al. 883). To paleoanthropologists, the footprints, together with bones, give
evidence of existence, just as the footprints Snowman finds provide evidence “of his own kind”
(Atwood, Oryx and Crake 372). For much of the novel, Atwood reveals Snowman as a less than
substantial figure, “existing and not existing,” “known only through rumours and . . . backwardpointing footprints” (7-8), but by “stamp[ing] his own good foot into the wet sand” (373), he
firmly establishes his own undeniable physical existence. The Australopithecines walked upright,
like us; whether or not they were ancestral is not significant. What is significant is the fact there
were many branches of the proto, near, and ancestral hominids that went extinct, pointing to the
temporality of species life, even human species life. If the rules of the game were changed to
include the distant past, the various hominids would be game points in Extinctathon, just as
Homo sapiens sapiens becomes after JUVE (344). Atwood reminds us that evolution and
extinction are not static, but ongoing processes, and humans, as biological entities, are included
in the system.
The Crakers are evolving, expressing emotions and constructing icons. Emoting when
Snowman returns from his journey to Paradice, “All are smiling happily; the children jump up
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and down, laughing; some of the women clap their hands with excitement.” They are
developing rituals—playing percussive instruments and chanting—and displaying “Symbolic
thinking,” as made evident in their material representation of Snowman (361). Nevertheless,
although they display what may signify an anthropogenic predilection toward religion, it is
stamped with a new ethos: following the “teaching of Oryx” in an emerging ecological
spirituality, they dismantle their art, returning it “to its place of origin” (363). Snowman feels
“he himself has been torn apart and scattered” through this de-composition, and originary
humanist approaches are dissembled and recast.
Snowman is evolving, too. His perception of nature is changing, perhaps indicating biophilic
inculcation. The beginning of the last chapter mirrors the first, but whereas he originally only
perceived the “rosy, deadly glow” that “still seems tender,” he now “gazes at it with rapture.”
Even though the birds’ cries still “sound like nothing human,” he now recognizes the sublime
natural beauty of the world (3, 371). The butchered rakunk the strangers are cooking elicits
empathic feelings, now appearing as a “poor creature” to him rather than a pest (373). Tellingly,
his empathy toward the Crakers has also grown, as his first impulse upon his return is to visit and
reassure them (359), and his chief concerns over the response of the strange humans is how they
will behave toward the Crakers. How will he “present[ ] the Crakers to them in the proper light”
to ensure their understanding (366)? Furthermore, he worries that he cannot explain the dangers
of human contact to the innocents, recognizing the impossibility of describing concepts of
colonialism, slavery, abuse, and rape with the available language tools. Finally, Snowman begins
to realize he is cared for in return by the Crakers: “He feels himself being lifted gently, carried,
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lifted again, carried again, held” (367). Snowman’s re-humanization signals the beginning of his
adaptation to the post-apocalyptic world.
On his way to meet the strangers, Snowman reiterates “An old conundrum of Crake’s”: “Can a
single ant be said to be alive . . . or does it only have relevance in terms of its anthill?” (371). A
following question might be can a single human be said to be human? Or does he/she only retain
humanity in terms of a social group? Snowman’s humanity is seemingly revivified in the context
of the developing Craker social unit, and although his blank-faced watch indicates the absence of
human-imposed order on the world, it may also signal a timeless opportunity for reanalyzing
human relationships with the rest of the biosphere. Jimmy/Snowman, the master story-teller,
“ma[kes] a narrative mistake” recounting his journey to the Crakers, an error that engenders a
sense of unbalance (362); his loss of balance encapsulates all that has proceeded in Oryx and
Crake’s human interactions with the biosphere. In Negotiating with the Dead, Atwood explains
the longevity and mutability of the oral story: “An orally transmitted tale does not die with the
teller,” but it “changes from teller to teller” (50). In Oryx and Crake, a world devoid of written
texts, stories once again become changeable and adaptable. Perhaps Atwood is signaling the
need for a new, adaptive narrative, wherein the post-human signifies an organism integrated into
its ecosystem rather than an intellectual singularity. This potential narrative promises a consilient
and ecological rendering of humanity: a survival guide in which animality and imagination share
equal roles in evolutionary endurance.
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